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ACRONYMS 
ADN Accion Democratica Nacionalista 
AP Acuerdo Patriotico 
APDHB Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de Bolivia 
ASP Asamblea por la Soberania de los Pueblos 
CAO Camara Agropecuaria del Oriente 
CIDOB Confederacion Indigena del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonia 
de Bolivia 
COMUNAL Coordinadora de Movilizaciones Unica Nacional 
COB Central Obrera Boliviana 
CONDEPA Conciencia de Patria 
CSUTCB Confederacion Sindical Unica de Trabajadores 
Campesinos de Bolivia 
GANPI Gran Asamblea Nacional de los Pueblos Indigenas 
IU Izquierda Unida 
LyJ Libertad y Justicia 
MAS Movimiento al Socialismo 
MBL Movimiento Bolivia Libre 
MIP Movimiento Indigenista Pachacuti 
MIR Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria 
MNR Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario 
MRTKL Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberacion 
MST Movimiento Sin Tierra 
NFR Nueva Fuerza Republicana 
PS-1 Partido Socialista-Uno 
UCS Unidad Civica Solidaridad 
UDP Union Democratica y Popular 

PREFACE 
Bolivia's president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada stepped down on 17 
October 2003. He did so after several weeks of mass protests. State repres-
sion, by that date, had already led to 70 deaths. The vice-president, Carlos 
Mesa, assumed power and now grapples with the challenge to reactivate 
the economy, to bring down fiscal deficits, to restore trust in the nation-
state's institutions and to de-escalate social conflict. 
In the near-final version of the present text, we had managed to include 
another, earlier protest eruption, taking place in February of that year. At 
the time, we saw these events as a final, conclusive warning with regard to 
Bolivia's governability, after it had received an earlier warning with the out-
come of the 2002 elections — the main theme of this analysis. It proved 
a fairly adequate assessment: when the authorities demonstrated that they 
still had not understood the message and were unwilling to change the 'set 
of rules and procedures established in accordance with prevailing relations 
of (political, military and economic) power',* and thus persisted in 
obstructing a democracy that the Bolivians would recognise themselves, a 
new confrontation was unavoidable. It erupted when the sale of Bolivian 
natural gas to Mexico and the USA via Chile was proposed, which 
Bolivians viewed as the selling-out of their natural resources, a deja-vu 
ploy for massive corruption and an affront to their anti-Chilean national-
ist feelings. These protests, as noted, culminated in the president's resigna-
tion and in an unprecedented blow to overall confidence in the institutions 
embodying Bolivia's democracy — the central point of our paper. Most of 
this paper was written before these events, in an attempt to contextualise 
and analyse the surprising outcomes of the 2002 elections in Bolivia, and 
examine the nature of a faulty democracy The analysis gained unforeseen 
bearing because of the recent events. Although we, towards the end of the 
text in its draft version, predicted hard times for Goni, we did of course 
not foresee the October outcomes. Directly after the dramatic events of 
October, we adapted the last section. The text now includes a reflection on 
these recent events, connecting them to the preceding analysis. 
* Vilas (1997), p. 9. 

Crisis in Bolivia: 
The Elections of 2002 and their Aftermath 
Introduction 
On 30 June 2002 Bolivia celebrated national elections and, for the fifth 
time since the return to democracy in 1982, the population expressed its 
political preferences in an atmosphere of perfect tranquillity and order, by 
Bolivian standards. The outcomes, surprising as they were, were acknowl-
edged without major protest by all contenders. No military meddling, no 
major street rallies to contest the outcome, no politician threatening to 
reject the results,1 interfered with the process. Minor protests, accusations 
of petty fraud at specific polling stations and bold declarations by Evo 
Morales, who finished second in the polls and is considered a radical pain 
in the neck by most established parties and the USA, did not have enough 
weight to damage the image of orderly and 'normal' democracy. 
Table 1: National Elections, 1985-2002 
Party/Front 1985 1989 1993 1997 2002 
MNR 26.4 23.0 33.8 18.2 22.5 
AP (ADN/MIR) 20.3 
ADN 28.6 22.7 22.3 3.4 
MIR 8.9 19.6 16.8 16.3 
CONDEPA 11.0 13.6 17.2 
UCS 13.1 16.1 5.51 
MBL 5.1 3.1 
IU 0.7 7.2 0.9 3.7 
PS-1 2.2 2.8 0.7 
NFR 20.9 
MAS 20.9 
MIP 6.1 
MRTKL 2.2 
LyJ 2.7 
Valid votes 1,728,363 1,573,790 1,731,309 2,177,171 2,778.808 
Sources: Dunkerley (2000), p. 44; Gamarra and Malloy (1995), p. 432; Yaksic and 
Tapia (1997); Corte Nacional Electoral, www.cne.org.bo. 
The party that eventually won the presidency in italics. For acronyms, see glossary. 
1 To be precise, there was one: Manfred Reyes of NFR. His protest however was, 
according to most comments, inspired only by deception and envy, and by anger 
about how he blew his own campaign because of overt lying and contradicting him-
self, and because of his connections with the Moon Sect, which made many Catholics 
opt for another choice. As a result of all this, he came in third instead of second, as 
polls had suggested. I lis Philippic, most comments concurred, reflected pettiness and 
not a serious accusation of fraud. 
Since none of the candidates won a straight majority, according to Bolivian 
rules a new president was to be elected by Congress from the two frontrun-
ners, MNR candidate and former president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and 
MAS candidate and coca growers' leader Evo Morales. On 4 August Sanchez 
de Lozada was elected and a few days later he assumed office.2 
At first glance it looks as if democracy in Bolivia has strengthened and 
consolidated itself. On closer inspection, however, the situation is far more 
complex than these images of normality suggest. Eight years ago, after 13 
years of civilian rule in Bolivia,3 Mainwaring and Scully classified the 
Bolivian party system as inchoate and weakly institutionalised, but noted that 
it was 'showing some signs of acquiring greater solidity'.4 Developments 
since then, and particularly the 2002 elections, have belied their prediction. 
The outcome of the elections clearly indicates that something beyond a 'nor-
mal' shift in preferences occurred and played havoc with the party system. 
One of the three large, traditional and established parties, ADN, did not 
even get four per cent of the vote. Another, MIR, moved to fourth place 
though its vote remained stable. Of two parties that had emerged in the early 
1990s and seemed on the way to consolidation, the UCS lost out heavily 
while CONDEPA was virtually wiped away. Their place was partly filled by 
a new populist party, NFR, led by Cochabamba's former mayor, Manfred 
Reyes Villa. This party ended up third in the party ranking, defeated by a 
margin of just hundreds of votes by the new number two. 
To the surprise of many, Evo Morales' leftist MAS became the new 
number two. Morales' stance is considered, by most of the establishment, 
to be beyond the pale and his party is not considered a potential coalition 
partner. And the party that came fifth, MIP, is another with a leader — 
peasant leader Felipe Quispe, El Mallku5 — seen as operating at the fringes 
of political legitimacy. Hence, two parties which obtained a remarkably 
strong vote are led by politicians who, during recent years, have backed 
extra-parliamentary protests against the Banzer government (1997-2002), 
rejected neoliberal policies, as well as alleged corruption and incompetence 
2 The elections also yielded a new Senate (27 seats) and Chamber of Deputies (130 
seats). When the president was elected by Congress he received 84 votes against 43 
votes for Evo Morales. Supporters of NFR candidate Manfred Reyes Villa annulled 
their vote, there were two blank votes and two absentions. 
3 Quite an achievement in a notoriously unstable country that entered the Guinness Book 
of Records with 188 coups d'etat in the 157 years between Independence in 1825 and 
the return to civilian rule in 1982 (Lindert and Verkoren, 1994, p. 17). During the 
nineteenth century the average duration of presidential mandates was two and a half 
years, during the 1900-1982 period it was one year and 11 months. Out of the 73 
presidents the country had between 1825 and 1982, 33 held office for less than a year 
(Lavaud, 1991, p. 19). 
4 Mainwaring and Scully (eds.)(1995), p. 19. 
5 An Andean honorific title. 
of all 'traditional elitist' politicians; two parties which most voices in the 
party-establishment accuse of being extremist and despicable. Moreover, 
they are parties voicing Indian discontent in Bolivia. The fact diat these 
new parties not only meet 'normal' hostility from the incumbent ones, but 
are denied the very status of legitimate representatives of societal griev-
ances, suggests that Bolivia's democracy may be deeply defective. 
Rather than moving in the direction of greater solidity, the Bolivian 
party system is going through a process of profound upheaval that, as we 
shall see, reflects the tensions that have been building up in Bolivian soci-
ety7 over the past decades. The country still seems to be some way from the 
green pastures of democratic governability. Over the past 20 years its 
movement toward the consolidation and institutionalisation of democracy 
may in O'Donnell's terms, well have been illusory in the sense that, 
although the minimal requirements of polyarchy may hold, a further tran-
sition toward a consolidated representative democratic regime is not yet 
achieved. Instead, the process seems to have stalled in what he calls a 'fee-
ble and uncertain situation'.6 In a somewhat similar vein, Lazarte (2001) 
has argued that, although Bolivians seem to adhere to the idea that democ-
raqT is the best form of government, they are far from contented with real-
ly existing Bolivian democracy7 And he goes on to argue that although 
there will always be a distance between ideal and real democracy, the ques-
tion is whether the points of connection between the two will not be 
strained to the point of rupture and collapse. This study examines the ten-
sions reflected in the upheaval in the Bolivian party system and shows that 
over the past few years die point of rupture may not have been far off, 
although so far 'institutionality' has been preserved. 
A second issue requiring explanation concerns the inroads made by 
'ethnic parties'.8 The new prominence of indigenous peoples in the 
Bolivian polity has been explained by pointing to changes in the political 
opportunity structure. Thus, the changes in the electoral system, in partic-
ular the introduction in 1996 of 68 uninominal districts for the election of 
the 130-seat Chamber of Deputies and the 1994 Law on Popular 
Participation, which opened up new opportunities for indigenous people 
through decentralisation and the creation of over 300 municipal political 
arenas, have been highlighted to explain their new prominence. Although 
such explanations are valid to some degree, they are also limited. Political 
opportunity structure theory sometimes tends to assume that in any soci-
ety there is somehow a constant level of discontent and grievance, which 
expresses itself when the opportunity arises.9 Although some of such the-
6 O'Donnell (1999a; 1999b). 
7 Lazarte (2001), p. 360. See also The Economist, 17 August 2002, pp. 41-2. 
8 \ an Cott (2003). 
9 Tar row (1994), pp. 81-99. 
orising is more sophisticated in its analysis of grievances, opportunities and 
mobilisation,10 Grindle (2000) and Van Cott (2003) focus on institutional 
engineering which opens up the polity for underrepresented groups, though 
Van Cott adds the caveat that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition.11 
Other authors, like Albo (1999), Ayo (1999) and Calla (2000) have provided 
more shaded analyses of the popular participation policy than Grindle's 
rather optimistic account, and suggest that it may well have contributed to a 
strengthening of local elites, and that over the course of time indigenous 
representatives have again been marginalised from local political arenas. In a 
recent study of the benefits of the popular participation policy and the new 
electoral rules for indigenous peoples and peasants Albo (2002) concludes 
that 'a gulf exists between grandiose rhetorical dreams and the little that can 
be concretely achieved, even in relatively favourable contexts'.12 This sug-
gests that mere analysis of institutional engineering will not do and that 
detailed exploration of political processes is in order. 
Such an analysis will show that there is more here than a 'flowing' of 
hidierto marginalised sectors of the population into newly opened chan-
nels for participation and representation. We shall show that it was exact-
ly the incapacity of the existing party system to reform itself and to rem-
edy the 'representation deficit' of the Bolivian polity13 that contributed to 
the rise of what are called the 'anti-systemics'. Whether the institutional 
system will be capable of reforming itself and thus contribute to the con-
solidation of something like O'Donnell's (1999a) democratic regime or 
whether further polarisation will burst 'institutionality' asunder remains to 
be seen. The challenge is great. 
The redemocratisation of Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s met 
with broad acclaim, but also produced disappointment and disillusion, since 
only fragments of the hopes connected to the democratisation processes 
materialised. It triggered renewed efforts to conceptualise the aim of 
'authentic' democratic consolidation.14 These efforts reveal different 
emphases, ranging from neo-Weberian focuses on religious—cultural features 
as the sine qua non for capitalism and democracy, to the primacy of rule of 
law15 and the listing of necessary preconditions in the realms of literacy, the 
mitigation of extreme socioeconomic clefts and industrialisation as prereq-
uisites for the production of the wealth required to sustain democratic sta-
bility, culminating in arguments that the generation and consolidation of cul-
10 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996). 
11 See also Van Cott (2002) 
12 Albo (2002), p. 63. 
13 Tapia and Toranzo (2000). 
14 O'Donnell (1999a), Diamond and Plattner (eds) (1996), Haynes (2001), Harto de 
Vera (ed) (2000) and Schor (2001). 
15 Schor (2001). 
tural values that uphold the democratic system represent the only legitimate 
way of resolving societal conflicts.16 Empirically testable, but rather crude, 
is Huntington's (1991) suggestion that consolidation be defined by the 
'two-turnover-test': if a party, in consecutive elections, passes from gov-
ernment to opposition and to government again, a polity passed the test. 
Most theorists, however, point to the necessary correlation between 
societal and institutional evolution to obtain consolidation. Ninou Guinot 
(2000) approaches the question of consolidation from a process perspec-
tive, emphasising the simultaneous gradual 'hardening' of institutions and 
procedures and the gradual growth of the regimes' societal legitimacy. She 
thus alludes to a double process: institutional strengthening and consolida-
tion going hand in hand with growing trust in these institutions' preroga-
tives and capacity to resolve matters peacefully and even-handedly. In other 
words, mutually reinforcing processes that take place within the polity and 
in society In her view, there are specific preconditions for such a develop-
ment, not all of which have been met in Latin America. First of all, on the 
societal level, a genuine commitment to the outcomes of electoral and pol-
icy processes, even in the face of electoral adversity or the passing of 
unpalatable measures, as well as a genuine acknowledgment of the opposi-
tions' rights and legitimacy, has to evolve. Such commitments are not yet a 
'solid fact' in various Latin American countries. A second and closely con-
nected condition is the unqualified acceptance of legality, both by govern-
ing and opposition forces. In present day Latin America, Ninou Guinot 
observes, there is still a considerable amount of 'semi-loyalty' to legality.17 
A third condition is the neutrality or neutralisation of the military because 
without their unreserved subjugation to democratic politics an element of 
fear — even if latent — haunts political participation. In this respect too, 
the process in Latin America has not finalised. Fourth, socioeconomic fac-
tors come into play. Disheartening economic performance and severe 
poverty and inequality in the long run affect the support for the incumbent 
system — which is exactly what is happening in various countries in the 
region. Fifth, the party system needs to be solid — that is, all parties need 
to adhere to democratic procedures, irrespective of their possible electoral 
frustration or perception of threats to their constituency's interests. On this 
point, too, it would be hard to take for granted the attitudes of all parties in 
all countries. Last, there is a need for a sufficient involvement of the state 
in the country's economy to warrant the states' capacity for controlling and 
redistributing resources, and thus foster trust in the state's capability to 
'make a difference' and consequently trust in the democratic system. 
Revising all these preconditions, Ninou Guinot concludes that various ele-
16 Ninou Guinot (2000), p. 126. 
17 Ibid., p. 145. 
ments are not going as badly as they could have: social conflict is less violent 
than it has been, rejections of the democratic system by parties or other 
political actors have been scarce and economic performance has been weak 
but monetary instability has largely been brought under control. Still, demo-
cratic consolidation is a huge challenge. The best way to portray the current 
situation, in her view, is to talk of 'partial consolidation'.18 
In a similar vein, Diamond (1996) perceives the necessity of a two-tier 
process, involving the state and civil society, to sustain democratic consol-
idation. In the realm of civil society crucial preconditions for consolida-
tion need to be achieved: its independence (but not alienation) from the 
state, its controlling function in relation to the state and a 'rich associa-
tional life'19 that fosters the skills of democratic citizens, as well as toler-
ance, moderation, willingness to compromise and respect for opposing 
viewpoints. Additionally, civil society can go beyond political party chan-
nels in the articulation, aggregation and representation of interests, result-
ing in participation, not least at local level.20 A mitigation of the principal 
polarities of political conflict would be an important result of civil soci-
ety's 'tasks', along with its active involvement in the observation and mon-
itoring of electoral and judicial procedures. Its function in the dissemina-
tion of information is another crucial aspect of its contribution to demo-
cratic consolidation. Resuming the main points of his analysis, Diamond 
asserts that '[B]y enhancing the accountability, responsiveness, inclusive-
ness, effectiveness and hence legitimacy of the political system, a vigorous 
civil society gives citizens respect for the state and positive engagement 
with it. In the end, this improves the ability of the state to govern .. ..'21 
Remarkably, however, Diamond adds that 'the single most important 
and urgent factor in the consolidation of democracy is not civil society but 
political institutionalization'.22 This sounds contradictory but, in 
Diamond's view, makes sense, because the citizens' adherence to democ-
racy and the rule of law is dependent on the performance of state institu-
tions. Consolidation, taken as 'the process by which democracy becomes 
so broadly and profoundly legitimate . . . that it is very unlikely to break 
down',23 rests on the institutional ability to 'ensure that government will be 
able to make and implement policies of some kind, rather than simply flail-
ing about, impotent or deadlocked'.24 Not a unilinear, but an interlocking, 
two-tier process surfaces from these considerations: a process through 
18 Ibid., p. 148. 
19 Diamond (1996), p. 230. 
20 Ibid., p. 231. 
21 Ibid., p. 234. 
22 Ibid., p. 238. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid, p. 239. 
which effective societal control and capable participation, Vigilance and 
loyalty',25 interact with the state's capacity to implement robust institutions. 
Linz and Stepan (1996) distinguish between behavioural, attitudinal and 
constitutional criteria that need to be met to consider a democracy 'con-
solidated'. The first point refers to the absence of principal actors aiming 
to topple democracy, the second to the 'rooted' belief that democracy is 
'the best way' and the third to the subjection of governmental and non-
governmental entities to the law and the concomitant procedures. 
In the literature on consolidation reviewed here, little is specified with 
regard to the degree to which popular sovereignty and access are circum-
scribed, nor is there any clear statement of the process whereby the criteria 
may eventually be met. This tends to be the problem in many of the 
propositions: the process through which 'ad hoc patterns of democratically 
oriented behaviour (. . .) eventually develop into the accepted way'26 is 
assumed rather than analysed or disaggregated into its constituting com-
ponents. Haynes distinguishes between rules, institutions and rights as pre-
requisites for democratic consolidation, and attempts to formulate the set 
of factors on which the chances for democratic consolidation hinge.27 
These factors are divided into political, economic and international cate-
gories. His elaboration, however, once again tends to fall into a teleologi-
cal and tautological argument, as becomes clear from formulations on 
these factors hinting at 'beneficial legacies', a 'pro-democracy political cul-
ture', 'forms of political and civil societies conducive to democracy', 'sus-
tained economic growth, relatively equitably spread' and the like.28 
Nonetheless, the question of popular access and sovereignty points to 
an issue that we will see emerging from our discussion of Bolivian democ-
racy as it has functioned over the past two decades and which takes us to 
O'Donnell's remarks on the 'halfway' situation in which the consolidation 
of a representative democratic regime has not been achieved.29 Bolivian 
democratic institutionality until now has strongly relied on 'pacts' among 
party leaderships and a spoils system which made it possible to carry 
through increasingly unpopular and often anti-popular economic policies 
at the cost of excluding most of the population from having any real influ-
ence on political decision-making. The breach between symbolic inclusion 
into the polity and the absence of effective influence generated mounting 
tensions as a result of which the upholding of the institutional order and 
the economic model increasingly came to rely on repression, turning 
Bolivia into a 'democradura'. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Uavnes (2001), p. 37. 
27 Ibid, p. 38. 
28 Ibid, pp. 44-9. 
29 O'Donnell (1999a; 199b). 
This is not the place to discuss all the intricacies of democratic consolidation. 
What we can learn from the above is that: a) no one-dimensional causal 
sequence can be held responsible for achieving 'consolidation'; b) a list of 
'necessary preconditions' for consolidation has analytical value but does not 
help much in the light of the fact that these preconditions cannot simply be 
created; c) the interrelatedness of societal and political/ institutional process-
es is crucial for understanding partial successes and failures; d) due to the 
very nature of the phenomenon in question, we are talking about a long-term 
and slow progress toward what might be called a 'consolidated democracy'; 
e) a 'real' and relevant intervention-potential on the part of the state is nec-
essary, and that its effectiveness is a crucial component in the growth of soci-
etal trust in the system; and f) 'consolidation' can only be validated as a 
process and in terms of ongoing discord on the contents of a democratic order. 
This paper seeks to put the Bolivian presidential elections into per-
spective in order to understand their 'surprising' outcome. We shall argue 
that this outcome does not simply reflect the discontent with the preced-
ing government of Hugo Banzer, the 'elected dictator',30 whose mandate 
was finished by Vice-President Jorge 'Tuto' Quiroga after Banzer was 
diagnosed with cancer and he resigned in August 2001. To be sure, the 
implosion of the ADN surely reflects specific discontent with a specific 
administration and the party did not even benefit from a 'condolence vote' 
after the death of its leader in May 2002. The decline of the UCS also can 
partly be explained by its participation in the 'megacoalition' that brought 
Banzer to power in 1997. On the other hand, the MIR, which also partic-
ipated in the 'mega', came out relatively unscathed. The second banxerato 
and its malgobierno are only part of the story. 
We suggest that to understand the outcomes of the 2002 elections an 
analysis of the return to democracy in 1982 and the shift to neoliberalism 
in 1985 is in order. The popular protests that unfolded after 1999 help to 
explain much of the electoral outcome and a closer look reveals that they 
were not only directed against a particular government,31 but also against 
a 'mode of development' imposed in 1985. At the same time they reveal 
the characteristics and problems of Bolivia's formally democratic political 
regime and suggest that the polity has, in a systematic and probably delib-
erate way, sought to exclude large sectors of the population from genuine 
control and participation. This points to a deficit in 'consolidation', espe-
cially with regard to the 'accountability, responsiveness, inclusiveness, 
effectiveness and hence legitimacy of the political system'.32 
30 Sivak (2001). 
31 Although protest was certainly also fuelled by the fact that Banker's government was 
characterised by the ongoing habit of politicking, sophisticated fraud, bargaining 
within political cliques and the like. 
32 Diamond (1996), p. 234. 
In the following section we will first present a very brief overview of 
Bolivia's political history since 1982, the year democracy was restored. We 
highlight Bolivia's 'double transition'. While the country became formally 
democratic, from 1985 onward it also adopted a neoliberal economic pol-
icy framework and after 1993 a series of 'second generation' reforms were 
introduced to complement the adjustment measures taken in 1985. In the 
second part of that section we take a closer look at the economic and soci-
etal characteristics of Bolivia in the 1990s and show that although the 
adjustment policies brought macroeconomic stability, they brought little 
benefit for the majority of the population and turned into a source of 
increasing discontent. 
In the third section we shall focus on the second Banzer government 
and show its incapacity to deal with gradually worsening economic condi-
tions. This ineptitude, in combination with the arrogance and shameless 
corruption that characterised the second bant^erato, provide the background 
for growing social discontent on which we will focus in the fourth section 
of this paper. In that section we will review the most important episodes 
of conflict that marked the Banzer government, beginning with the con-
flict over the privatisation of water supply in the city of Cochabamba in 
early 2000. For its outcomes — the rescission of the contract with a 
transnational company that was to take charge of the water supply in the 
city, and the repeal of new legislation on water management in the coun-
try — that conflict often is considered a turning point. After 15 years of 
neoliberal policies and ineffective protests, the conflict in Cochabamba 
ended in what was considered a victory of the popular movement. The 
conflict was the first in a series of 'social convulsions' that marked the final 
years of the Banzer government. The way in which the government 
responded to these movements is revealing about the 'representation 
deficit' that characterises Bolivia's formally democratic polity. Pent-up dis-
content in the face of an unresponsive, inept and, moreover, thoroughly 
corrupt political class accounts for a growing support for 'anti-systemic' 
politicians. In our fifth section we outline die development of the Bolivian 
party system, discuss the coalition that supported the second Banzer gov-
ernment and the rise of 'anti-systemic' forces. We thus portray the politi-
cal climate in which some of the protagonists of the social protests, such 
as MAS leader Evo Morales and MIP leader Felipe Quispe, became attrac-
tive alternatives for the electorate. This is followed by a concluding section 
in which we seek to connect our overview of the development of the 
Bolivian politics and the party system with some of the dieoretical notions 
on democratic consolidation introduced above. 
Most of this text was written in the months immediately following the 
2002 elections. In February 2003 Bolivia again became the scene of dra-
matic clashes between protest movements and the 'forces of order' and in 
September and October of that year a protest movement unfolded that 
resulted in the disgraceful renunciation of President Gonzalo Sanchez de 
Lozada. In view of these events we have added a last section describing 
and analysing the events that led to his downfall. 
II 
Bolivia in transit; an overview 
When the first banzerato (1971-78) had come to a close with Hugo Banzer's 
resignation, Bolivia entered a roller-coaster process of democratic transi-
tion punctuated by the dictatorships of Alberto Natush Bush and Luis 
Garcia Meza.33 Finally, in 1982, a government supported by a centre-left 
Union Democratica Popular coalition had been installed. It was headed by 
Hernan Siles Zuazo, one of the veterans of the 1952 Revolution. He faced 
the task of managing a virtually bankrupt economy and meeting pent-up 
popular demands. The UDP government attempted to revamp the nation-
al-revolutionary economic model installed in 1952, but this attempt ended 
in dismal failure. Inflation turned into hyperinflation and social unrest was 
seething. Finally, in a dramatic gesture, Siles stepped down and convoked 
elections a year before ending his constitutional mandate. He was suc-
ceeded by another veteran of the Revolution, Victor Paz Estenssoro 
(1985-89) of the MNR, who was elected president in Congress with the 
support of the ADN, the party that Hugo Banzer founded after stepping 
down from his dictatorial seat. The MNR and ADN signed a Pact for 
Democracy. At the end of August 1985 the Paz Estenssoro government 
introduced a New Economic Policy (NEP) through Decree 21060. 
The NEP consisted of a harsh shock treatment designed by Planning 
Minister Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada with the help of Jeffrey Sachs. With 
the introduction of neoliberal policies it brought an end to the 'national-
revolutionary cycle' initiated in 1952.34 Jeffrey Sachs famously stated that 
the new policies would turn Bolivia's poor and miserable economy with 
hyperinflation into a poor and miserable economy with stable prices. The 
NEP consisted of the usual recipe to reduce the fiscal deficit, reform the 
monetary system, rationalise bureaucracy through mass dismissal, liberalise 
markets, promote exports and reform the tax system. It also involved an 
overhaul of the state-owned mining company, which was accelerated when 
the tin market crashed in 1985. The government opted for the dismissal — 
euphemistically called 'relocation'— of 23,000 miners. Such massive lay-
offs, carried through despite protests, marked the defeat of the once so 
33 Whitehead (1994). 
34 According to Gamboa (2001, p. 96), Paz Estenssoro in this period undid almost 
everything he had helped to build in the years after the 1952 revolution. 
proud Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) in which miners' unions had played 
a key role. A further effect of trade liberalisation was that Bolivian markets 
were swamped with cheap imported goods, leading to the closure of many 
large and medium-sized factories. Urban unemployment jumped from less 
than six per cent in 1985 to 12 per cent in 1988.35 To mitigate the effects 
of the harsh stabilisation package a Fondo Social de Emergen da (FSE) was 
created in 1986,36 but the social cost of structural adjustment was extreme 
and Decree 21060 remains an emblematic target of social protest. At the 
same time it should be noted that the relative macroeconomic success of 
the NEP was also related to the fact that the package facilitated the laun-
dering of narco-dollars. Cocaine became the country's most important 
export product and the relative importance of the coca economy has been 
estimated to range between something like 20 and 50 per cent of GDP.37 
By the end of the Paz Estenssoro administration the MNR unilateral-
ly broke off the Pact for Democracy and put forward Sanchez de Lozada 
as presidential candidate. Although he won most of the votes in the 1989 
elections the bad feelings created by the unilateral rescission of the Pact 
drove the one-time archenemies Banzer and Jaime Paz Zamora (MIR) — 
until then separated by a 'sea of blood'— into a coalition against the 
MNR. They brokered a gentleman's agreement, the Acuerdo Patriotico 
(AP), that allowed Paz Zamora to become president (1989-93). His gov-
ernment essentially continued the adjustment policies but the new coali-
tion showed little coherence in its economic policies. The absence of eco-
nomic growth eroded popular support, while the dubious ratification of 
investment, mining and hydrocarbon codes led to a clash with the MNR 
opposition and a grave constitutional crisis when the AP government 
decided to impeach eight Supreme Court members after a ruling in favour 
of the MNR opposition. During his presidency Paz Zamora dedicated 
himself to international tours on which he sought to explain that coca is 
not cocaine, while Banzer eventually came to dominate internal politics, 
which mostly revolved around the division of spoils. Internationally, the 
government became suspected of involvement with the drug trade.38 
The 1993 elections yielded an IvINR government headed by Gonzalo 
'Goni' Sanchez de Lozada (1993-97), with Aymara leader Victor Hugo 
Cardenas as his vice-president in a surprising alliance between the MNR 
and one of the small Katarista parties, the MRTK-L.39 Cardenas had trans-
35 Baldivia (2000), p. 76. 
36 In 1991, this fund was succeeded bv the Fondo de Inversion Social (FIS). 
37 Laserna (1997), p.177. 
38 In 1997, MIR party stalwart Oscar Fid Franco was jailed for four years for complic-
ity with drug traders. The USA withdrew Paz Zamora's entry visa, which, however, 
was renewed in May 2001. 
39 Albo (1994). For an overview of indigenous peoples' movements in Bolivia also see 
Assies (2000) and Van Cott (2000). 
formed into a more intellectualist, and therefore to the mestizo electorate 
more digestible, indigenous leader who championed the cause of pluricul-
turalism and multiethnicism. Not only because of the rightist/leftist mar-
riage was this alliance remarkable; it was also conspicuous because tradi-
tionally the MNR had either denied or simply neglected the ethnic element 
in Bolivian politics. The decree to replace the word 'Indio' by that of 
'campesino' after the 1952 Revolution was her doing and more in general 
the party represented a nationalist rather than a multicultural doctrine. But 
the MNR had changed. It had opened up to ideas around decentralisation, 
participation and multiculturalness,40 and was ready for implementing a 
'second generation' of neoliberal reforms that, among others things, was 
aimed at a modernisation of the state apparatus. 
After the elections the MNR government signed a 'governability pact' 
with the UCS, while on the other hand it came to an agreement with the 
small MBL, thus assuring itself of sufficient parliamentary support. The 
make-up of this coalition between a core of MNR neoliberal technocrats 
and MBL and MRTK-L reformers resulted in a policy mix of 'neoliberal 
social reformism'. One outcome was the creation of three 'superministries'. 
New Ministries of Economic Development and Sustainable Development 
would be in charge of the main macroeconomic policy decisions. A 
Ministry of Human Development would be in charge of the social sector. 
This provided the institutional framework for a flurry of reforms meant to 
complement the structural adjustment operated since 1985. 
Among the outstanding interventions was the 'capitalisation policy', the 
Bolivian variant of privatisation whereby public enterprises were turned 
into mixed enterprises and 50 per cent of their assets were sold on the 
stock market, a reform that was linked to a reform of the pension system. 
Another important reform was the introduction of the Law on Popular 
Participation in 1994. This law implied an extensive overhaul and decen-
tralisation of the country's political-administrative structure through the 
upgrading of the, until then insignificant, municipal level of government.41 
The share in total government investment by local governments rose from 
about nine per cent in 1994 to about 25 per cent by the end of the 1990s, 
while the share of central government declined from 65 per cent to 29 per 
cent. At the same time, this law was meant to incorporate Bolivia's indige-
nous population through the recognition of traditional authorities and by 
40 The commitment to multiculturalness, however, may not have been that profound. In 
part it seems to have been a ploy to attract electors who would vote for the MIR or 
CONDEPA. The designing of Victor Hugo Cardenas was in good part an outcome of 
a political marketing study. The dedication of neoliberals to multiculturalism is embed-
ded in their views on decentralisation and a particular brand of participation, views that 
often are at odds with the aspirations of indigenous peoples' movements (Calla, 2000). 
41 In 1995 a Law on Administrative Decentralisation was introduced that basically con-
cerned the Departmental level. 
granting legal status to peasant and indigenous communities and indige-
nous peoples, as well as neighbourhood associations. A reform of the edu-
cation system aimed at intercultural, bilingual and participative education. 
In 1996 new agrarian and forestry legislation was introduced. Reform of 
the Constitution in 199442 not only recognised the multiethnic makeup of 
Bolivian society but also paved the way for reform of the Judiciary and of 
the electoral system. A reform in 1996 created 68 single-member districts 
for the election of part of the Chamber of Deputies. Although the reform 
was meant to fortify the existing party system and strengthen its grip on 
local politics, it had the unintended effect of providing an opening for new 
parties. This effect became clearly visible in the 2002 elections. 
The net result of the Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada administration was 
an impressive series of privatisations and a further liberalisation of the 
economy coupled to significant reforms in many areas. On the whole, 
many external observers concurred in their opinion that a modernisation 
of the Bolivian state and politics had made substantial progress. On the 
other hand the shock treatment and the reforms have only yielded rather 
modest economic results with GDP growth just above four per cent per 
year from 1990 onward; relatively good by Latin American standards, but 
too low to bring much solace to the bulk of the population, particularly 
when one takes into account that the population grew by 2.4 per cent per 
year. The first and second-generation reforms introduced since 1985 set 
the stage for the Banzer administration that took charge in 1997. But 
before we address this second banzerato, we will first sketch the social and 
economic situation in the country in the 1990s. 
One of the notable features of Bolivian 'development' since 1985 is 
that in sector terms the composition of GDP has hardly changed. The 
main sectors remain agriculture, natural resources (mining, oil and gas), 
industry (agro-industry, textiles and oil refinery) and commerce, which 
together represent over 50 per cent of the GDP.43 The sectoral composi-
tion of the economically active population did change, however. We have 
not been able to locate disaggregated data on the composition of the eco-
nomically active population (EAP) in 1985, but the following data from the 
2001 CEPAL Statistical Yearbook are suggestive: in 1970 agriculture 
absorbed 59 per cent of the EAP, in 1980 52 per cent and in 1990 42.8 per 
cent. The percentage of the EAP in industry44 was 19.5 per cent, 20.6 per 
42 Ratified in early 1995. 
43 Major growth sectors are gas and oil and telecommunications, which do not generate 
much employment. Natural gas has become Bolivia's main export product since 
exports to Brazil started in 1999. iVlso note that the growth in telecommunications is 
suggestive of an emerging 'digital divide'. 
44 Mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, electricity, gas, water and sanitary 
services. 
cent and 23 per cent, respectively, while the percentages for the service sec-
tor45 were 21.5 per cent, 27.4 per cent and 34.2 per cent. In short, 
employment in agriculture dropped, it remained more or less the same in 
industry, while the service sector grew. This sectoral relocation of the EAP 
was accompanied by a brutal deterioration in employment conditions. 
Table 2: Composition of the Gross Domestic Product and the 
Economically Active Population 
1985 1999 
Activity per cent 
GDP 
per cent 
GDP 
per cent 
EAP 
Agriculture 16.2 15.3 40.0 
Oil and natural gas 5.7 4.8 
Mining 5.0 5.2 1.5 
Industry 16.2 18.1 11.4 
Electricity, gas and water 1.4 2.0 0.2 
Construction and public works 3.2 4.1 5.8 
Commerce 8.6 9.1 16.2 
Transport and communications 8.4 11.6 5.0 
Finance and related services 9.6 15.8 2.5 
Social and personal services 4.6 5.4 6.6 
Restaurants and hotels 3.8 3.4 3.9 
Public administration 11.8 9.9 6.9* 
Source: Antelo (2000), p.70; INE (2001). 
includes education. 
Data provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America are sug-
gestive of what happened under structural adjustment policies.46 While 
employment in the public sector declined this was not made up for by the 
private sector, implying an increasing informalisation of the economy. 
While open unemployment declined from its 1988 level of 12 per cent to 
45 Commerce, transport, storage and communications, and services. 
46 CEPAL (2001). 
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levels under five per cent until it started to rise again after 1999 to reach 
about eight per cent47 in 2001, over half of the occupied population is 
underemployed.48 
Table 3: Bolivia: Distribution of the Economically Active 
Occupied Population according to Type of Employment, 
Urban Areas (1989-99) 
Employers Salaried Self employed 
Total Public Private and non-
sector sector remunerated 
family workers 
1989 2.2 53.8 17.9 35.9 43.8 
1994 7.6 54.1 12.8 41.3 38.4 
1997 7.0 46.1 10.5 35.6 46.8 
1999 4.2 48.1 10.3 37.8 48.2 
Source: CEPAL (2001), p.187. 
These data do not reflect what happened in rural areas and only pardy 
reveal the deterioration of labour conditions in what are officially dubbed 
the 'formal' and 'informal' sectors.49 The implementation of structural 
adjustment policies contributed to an informalisation and precarisation of 
labour conditions,50 and also was a deliberate, and rather successful, poli-
cy to undermine and disarticulate the existing trade-union structure that 
had been the main vehicle for popular protest up to 1985.51 
To depict the productive structure of the country economist Horst 
Grebe has proposed the '10—100—500,000' formula. Some ten 'capitalised' 
enterprises virtually control the strategic sectors of the economy where the 
production of goods and services is concerned. Theoretically their doing 
should be regulated by the system of control through superintendencies 
that started to be put into place in the context of the 'second generation' 
47 Open unemployment in the capital cities. 
48 Baldivia (2000).' 
49 The informal sector represented 45 per cent of employment in 1997 and grew to rep-
resent 53 per cent in 2000 (Quintero, 2002). 
50 Although D.S. 21060 introduced important changes in labour relations and eliminat-
ed various guarantees reform of the 1942 Labour Law is considered a pending task. 
There was some pressure to undertake a reform and introduce more flexible rules, 
but the government postponed reforms. Meanwhile, flexibilisation of labour relations 
is taking place. 
51 Kruse (2002). 
reforms. They are followed by some 100 national and transnational enter-
prises with presence in the industrial, mining, banking and commercial 
agriculture sectors. Finally, there is a substratum of some 500,000 micro-
enterprises in agriculture, trade and handicraft production with extremely 
low levels of productivity and little capacity for economic transforma-
tion.52 This sketch highlights the magnitude of the informal sector and can 
be coupled with data on poverty levels that range from 47 per cent in 1997 
according to the poverty lines method to the 70 per cent estimate for 1992 
according to the basic needs approach. Despite the fact that some 
improvement has been registered in the course of the 1990s, poverty 
remains abysmal, particularly in the rural areas. While the relative incidence 
of poverty declined somewhat, the absolute number of poor increased.53 
Such conditions have made the country eligible for the Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), which conditions debt relief on the exe-
cution of poverty alleviation programmes, in 1997 and again in 2001.54 
By the mid-1980s Bolivia had become a predominantly urban country 
and nowadays more than 60 per cent of its 8.2 million inhabitants lives in 
urban areas.55 This shift, moreover, took place in the context of a change 
in the distribution of the population with a relative decline of the Andean 
zone and a clear concentration of the population in the eastern lowlands, 
particularly in and around Santa Cruz, which has become a mayor agrari-
an growth pole. One might say that Bolivia is increasingly becoming an 
Amazonian country'.56 Whereas in the Andes region the cultivated area 
contracted during the 1990s, due to exhaustion, erosion and adverse 
weather conditions, in the Santa Cruz region it doubled, mainly due to the 
expansion of soybean production and cattle-raising.57 And, while the 
Andes region is characterised by an extreme fragmentation of landholding 
and low productivity, the lowland region is characterised by an extreme 
concentration of landholding with huge farms being surrounded by pre-
carious smallholding colonists.58 The agrarian legislation introduced in 
52 Ibid. 
53 Moreover, the polarisation of income distribution has increased in recent years 
(CEPAL, 2001, p. 237; Milenio, 2000, p. 57). 
54 By the late 1990s Bolivian external debt amounted to nearly US$4.4 billion, corre-
sponding to over half of its GDP. Debt relief under the 1997 HIPC initiative 
amounted to US$448 million, with Japan granting additional debt relief of US$371 
million in NPV terms. 
55 In the Andean region temporary migration to the urban areas can be likened to the 
inclusion of another 'ecological niche' in peasant survival strategies. 
56 In 1997 Bolivia, which also belongs to the Andean Community, became an associate 
member of MERCOSUR. 
57 Demeure (1999). 
58 Urioste and Pacheco (2000). 
1996 has not significantly remedied the situation in the agrarian sector and, 
as we shall see, has often become a source of tension in its own right. 
Finally, while Bolivia has made some attempts to diversify its exports it 
still relies on a few products, which are exported with litde value added in 
an often adverse world market. Since the mid 1990s the export of natural 
gas has become a main source of income for the country:59 Although 
politicians promised that this would benefit the population at large, many 
suspected that the eventual gains would only line the pockets of a happy few, 
a suspicion that underpinned the mobilisations against the mega-project to 
export gas to the United States and Mexico, which led to Sanchez de 
Lozada's fall in October 2003. Meanwhile, people became one of the 
important 'non-traditional exports' of the country. By the early 1990s some 
140,000 migrants were registered in Argentina,60 and when in February 1998 
an agreement on migration was signed between the two countries the num-
ber of illegal Bolivian residents was estimated at 700,000. 
Adjustment measures thus have contributed little to turning Bolivia's 
economy into a flourishing one that benefits the population and reduces 
poverty levels. The situation worsened by the end of the 1990s, under the 
Banzer government. In 1999 the growth rate of the Bolivian economy 
slumped from 4.7 per cent in the previous year to less than one per cent. 
This was partly due to the aftershocks of the 1997 Asian crisis and the 
effect of the 1999 financial crisis in Brazil, but also to the fact that such 
effects were not mitigated by any measures on the part of the Bolivian 
government, which talked of a temporary 'de-acceleration' and belatedly, 
in March 2000, came up with a rather ineffective Economic Reactivation 
Programme. The Argentine crisis of 2002 further aggravated the situation 
as Bolivia lost an export market and was swamped with cheapened 
Argentine exports, whether legal or not. Moreover, the crisis has triggered 
a return migration of Bolivians who somehow have to make a living in the 
fledgling economy of their home country. 
As most consolidation theorists will agree, the economic conditions 
briefly outlined here hardly provide an environment propitious to demo-
cratic consolidation. Opposition to neoliberal policies has been steadily 
growing among the Bolivian population and it would be an important 
motive in the social protests that marked the second Banzer government. 
We shall first provide a brief overview of this period and then focus on 
this series of protests that eventually translated into the surprising out-
come of the 2002 elections. 
59 In 1994 ENRON was contracted to construct a 'gasoduct' to Brazil under conditions 
highly beneficial to the enterprise (Yaksic and Tapia, 1997, pp. 149-54). Exports to 
Brazil started in 1999. 
60 Crimson and Paz (2000). 
III 
The second banzerato 
Hugo Banzer Suarez competed in the 1997 elections with a discourse 
emphasising the need for a more 'social' turn with respect to the imple-
mentation of the neoliberal reforms, exploiting, on the one hand, Goni's 
critic's phrase of calling him a vendepatria, a 'fatherland-seller', but on the 
other hand reluctant to affirm a reversal of these policies. In the elections 
he obtained only a meagre first majority, and needed to negotiate with var-
ious other parties to get a parliamentary majority together. In the days after 
the elections a coalition was brokered that basically united against the 
MNR and assured that Banzer would be elected in Congress. The new 
'megacoalition' consisted of the ADN, MIR, CONDEPA and UCS. 
Before the elections the ADN already had established a pact with the NFR 
and some minor parties. One of the first acts of the new government 
would be to abandon the 'superministries' created by the previous admin-
istration and increase the total number of ministries from ten to 14. This 
was not so much to streamline the executive machinery but rather to 
accommodate the many coalition partners. It was one of the first signs of 
the patrimonialism and prebendalism — never entirely absent in Bolivia — 
that became the hallmarks of the Banzer government. ADN got seven 
ministries, MIR three, CONDEPA two, the UCS and NFR one each. This 
assured the new government of about two-thirds of the votes in Congress. 
The new megacoalition government lacked any defined programme. At 
the first cabinet meeting of his five-year mandate,61 on 16 August, the 
president arrived with what he called the Ten Commandments of his 
administration: strict adherence to the law, respect for the citizen, the pro-
hibition to misuse state property, austerity, discipline, sobriety, a sense of 
self-critique, modesty, democratic conviviality, honesty.62 As it turned out, 
most of these commandments were to be honoured in the breach. In the 
absence of a programme the new government came up with an innova-
tion, which turned out an excellent international marketing gimmick. It 
called for a national dialogue that was to unite various social actors, civil 
society as well as the opposition to define the pathways to be followed to 
project the country into the next century. By November the dialogue was 
declared to have yielded a government programme that revolved around 
four vaguely defined 'pillars': Opportunity, which was to be achieved 
through economic growth, aiming for a growth rate of seven per cent by 
the end of the administration; Equity, which was to cover human devel-
61 The 1994 constitutional reform, ratified in February 1995, had extended the presi-
dential mandate from four to five years. 
62 Sivak (2001), pp. 74-5. 
opment, health, education and struggle against poverty; Institutionality, 
which included the strengthening and modernisation of democratic insti-
tutions and the Judiciary, administrative decentralisation and a struggle 
against corruption; and Dignity, the struggle against the drug trade and the 
aim of eradicating all 'excess' coca. 
As to the last point, the new administration had felt the pressure of the 
US government that soon after Banzer assumed power warned that he 
should comply with the coca eradication targets to guarantee 'certification'. 
The Banzer government made some diplomatic efforts to turn the unilat-
eral 'certification' practices of the USA into multilateral schemes under the 
aegis of the OAE. It would, however, obstinately comply with USA fun-
damentalism in the 'war on drugs' and eradication was to become about 
the only 'achievement' the government could boast of, incurring, as we shall 
see, heavy social and political costs. Apart from the initiative on 'certification' 
in the first months Banzer stoked up nationalist sentiments by raising the 
issue of anti-personnel land mines installed by the Pinochet regime along the 
southern border and clamouring for access to the sea, lost in 1879 in the 
Pacific War.63 Meanwhile, Vice-President Jorge Quiroga took charge of eco-
nomic policies and attended meetings with the multilateral financial agencies. 
At home the partners in the megacoalition squabbled over power shares, 
heralding another enduring feature of the government period. 
W hile during the first year of the Banzer administration it was com-
mented that it was making a slow start, it would become increasingly clear 
that it hardly came to governing at all, as was reflected in Banzer's repeat-
ed assertions, in the wake of cabinet reshuffles, that he now would really 
be ready for the task. It was not only the instability and heterogeneity of 
the 'mega' that plagued the administration. According to a cynical news-
paper comment his government was characterised by the fact that it nei-
ther had the time nor the capacity to execute any programme at all because 
it had a full-time job dealing with a never-ending series of incidents and 
scandals it produced itself. That may be somewhat exaggerated, but there 
can be little doubt that the most remembered accomplishments of the sec-
ond banzerato and its entourage are marked by reactive measures, disgrace-
ful walk-outs of cabinet members, panicky play and reversals of legislation 
when it met with severe protest. 
63 Even Bolivians joked about Banzer's vehement rhetoric and said that he onlv needed 
the sea to bathe his whale, referring to Banzer's rather voluminous wife Yolanda Prada. 
The fact that Bolivia has no access to the sea has, ever since the Pacific War, been a 
national trauma, used and abused by politicians either fuelling nationalistic fervour to 
distract from other issues or countering a fall in popularity. Often, hightened feelings of 
indignation in the country, and worsened bilateral relations with Chile were then de-
escalated with some symbolic measure such as the renaming of the Avenida Chile into 
the Avenida del Paci'fico. Symbolic, since Bolivia is absolutely no match for Chile. 
Alongside irresolution with regard to longer-term political strategy, the 
first year of the Banzer government was characterised by an austere eco-
nomic policy and the stated intention to complete the privatisation process 
through the further privatisation of the oil and gas sector, the electricity 
sector, the Vinto foundry, the rest of the mining and iron and steel sector 
and the enterprises run by Bolivia's nine Prefectures. On the other hand, 
airports and water provision were to be given in concession. Meanwhile, 
economic policy was aimed at tightly managing the macroeconomic indi-
cators. According to the Banzer government the outgoing administration 
of cGoni' Sanchez de Lozada had left the economy in precarious condi-
tions, had expanded the bureaucracy and let foreign debt increase. 
Bolivians had to pay the bill of the fiesta gonista said Labour Minister 
Leopoldo Lopez in March 1998 when the COB protested what were seen 
as meagre wage increases for public sector employees.64 
As one of its measures to combat poverty the government announced 
an expansion of micro-credit programmes in order to generate employ-
ment and in April 1998 it launched its Plan Oportunidad that should con-
tribute to a reactivation of the economy that suffered the consequences of 
the international financial crisis and the El Nino phenomenon. The Plan 
included the substitution of the BONOSOL pension scheme introduced 
by the previous government by a new scheme of individualised share hold-
ing, the BOLIVIDA. The idea was that this would promote internal sav-
ings and make funding available for investment.65 
As in the course of 1999, the effects of the Asian crisis did not simply 
blow over but rather were exacerbated by the Brazilian financial crisis, one 
of the measures taken to promote investment was the approval of the Ley 
Corazon (March 1999), which allows foreign capital to invest in areas with-
in 50 kilometres of the border in infrastructure for energy export, gas and oil 
64 With inflation estimated at around three per cent, but in fact turning out to be 4.4 per 
cent, the increases ranged between 3.5 per cent and 6.5 per cent. Three months later a 
new salary scale for the president and the rest of his government was decreed which aug-
mented their salaries between 650 per cent and 1,000 per cent. In October the Chamber 
of Deputies blocked a Senate resolution by which the presidents of the two Chambers 
were granted a pension for life equivalent to the monthly allowance for a senator. 
65 The 1996 BONOSOL scheme was linked to the capitalisation policy. The sale of 50 per 
cent of the shares of state enterprises provided the funds that would be administered 
by Administradores de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs), while further funds would come 
from individual contributions. This should assure that all Bolivians that in December 
1995 were over 20 years old would receive a pension at the age of 65. A BONOSOL 
of US$248 was paid for the first time in May 1997, some months before the elections. 
It was meant to benefit 360,000 persons but it suffered quite some operational prob-
lems and the AFPs complained about liquidity problems. The next year they suspend-
ed payments. The new government argued that the scheme was unsustainable and with 
the introduction of a Popular Credit and Property Law in June 1998 created the 
BOLIVIDA to be paid from 2000 onward. This despite the well publicised attempts of 
Sanchez de Lozada to save the earlier scheme through recourse to the Supreme Court. 
exploitation and telecommunications. At the same time virtually the whole 
agricultural sector was declared to be in a state of emergency This pardy was 
a response to the increasing pressure from die Santa Cruz based Camara 
Agropecuaria del Oriente (CAO). Soy-producers faced decreasing profitabil-
ity as they had strongly expanded production into increasingly marginal areas 
and had depleted natural resources, to which they responded by reducing 
production by about a quarter and calling for support schemes. They also 
took the opportunity to press for important modifications in agrarian legisla-
tion under the argument that diis was needed for economic reactivation. In 
April die government acceded to the demands made by the CAO and signed 
an agreement that included a reprogramming of credits, rescheduling of 
debts and other support measures, as well as the creation of a joint commis-
sion to study modifications to agrarian legislation and land taxation. Peasants 
and small farmers complained that die government only supported large-
scale capitalist agriculture while, as we shall see, the CAO proposal to amend 
agrarian legislation added fuel to already brewing land conflicts in the region. 
Dutifully complying with IMF instructions to contain the fiscal deficit, in 
September 1999 the government instructed die institutions depending on the 
National Treasury to reduce their budgets for the coming year by 30 per cent 
and announced furdier austerity. Within die new economic policies there is 
no room for anti-cyclical measures. However, in March 2000, while a conflict 
over the privatisation of the water supply was rapidly escalating in 
Cochabamba, die government finally came up with a more comprehensive 
Economic Reactivation Plan, which consisted of four pillars. The first was 
financial reactivation through die emission of 'reactivation bonds' to the 
value of US$250 million by the Nacional Financiera Boliviana (NAFIBO) in 
order to strengthen the financial capacity of the banking system and its capac-
ity to reschedule outstanding debts. The second pillar consisted of a tax relief 
scheme, lowering taxes on the import of capital goods and exports, on 
forestry activities and on stock market transactions. Third came a plan to 
improve the road network, and finally emergency programmes to create 
employment were announced. The Plan, adorned with a photograph of a 
fatherly smiling Banzer, was divulged as a supplement to various national 
newspapers and met with scepticism as well as the critique that it was basi-
cally geared to bankers and large entrepreneurs. 
The Plan failed to turn the tide, partly because the government was 
rapidly losing credibility and slow in executing the Plan. Escalating social 
conflict, the Water War' in Cochabamba and the roadblocks by coca-
growers and peasants in most of the country in April and 'Black 
September' made things worse. By the end of October the government 
issued complementary legislation that modified some aspects of the Plan, 
but this 'reactivation of the reactivation' turned out timid and hardly to 
the point. Other measures were an Intensive Employment Programme, 
the decisions to pay the BOLIVIDA of a mere US$6066 and to extinguish 
the official housing scheme (FONVIS) and return contributions to the 
contributors, and to reschedule municipal debts. By then the government 
coalition, as well as its leading party, had entered into a phase of acute 
decomposition and reactivation did not materialise. 
While popular protests had marked 2000, by the end of that year entre-
preneurs, especially those from the Oriente, became increasingly resdess 
and even started questioning the economic model and to threaten 'civil 
resistance'. Faced with this new challenge the government started a dia-
logue with the sector and, in March 2001, reached an agreement in which 
complementary measures were promised, mostly in the area of debt 
rescheduling and tax reduction. Commentators observed that the measures 
might be quite beneficial for a small group, but that they failed to address 
fundamental issues such as employment or the plight of the small pro-
ducers. Moreover, the agreement included stipulations about enabling 
peasants to use their land as a collateral, a proposal insistendy forwarded 
by agro-entrepreneurs and fiercely rejected by peasant organisations. 
Meanwhile, a Second National Dialogue had started — or rather been 
declared — in May 2000, and ideas about an Estrategia Boliviana de 
Reduction de Pobreza (EBRP), on which the enhanced HIPC was condi-
tioned, were circulating. HIPC II would amount to US$854 million in NPV 
terms with the Paris Club granting an additional US$262 million. A Ley del 
Dialogo, supposed to be the outcome of the Second National Dialogue, was 
adopted in May 2001, but met with strong opposition as it proposed to make 
the municipalities responsible for contracting teachers and medical person-
nel67 It also included proposals aiming at the privatisation of natural and bio-
diversity resources. Moreover, only officially recognised civil society actors 
had been allowed to participate in the Dialogue coordinated by Vice-
President Jorge Quiroga, so it could hardly be said that it yielded anything like 
a national consensus. Millions of Bolivians suffering harsh consequences of 
the crisis and the failing measures to counter it never met with an opportuni-
ty to participate in the dialogue on causes and remedies for the situation 
Bolivia faced. The real impact of the HIPC II initiative on poverty is also 
questioned. According to the La Paz-based Centro de Estudios para el 
Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA), the slump in Bolivian tax income in 
66 The postponement and the meagreness of the BOLIVIDA prompted protests result-
ing in chilling and surreal images of barefoot pensioners crossing the highland land-
scape (CEDIB, March 2001). 
67 Teachers and medical personnel reject 'municipalisation' as they fear it will worsen 
their labour conditions and municipalities are unwilling to assume such responsibili-
ties arguing that they lack sufficient funding. The HIPC II resources are to be dis-
tributed according to a formula that favours the poorer municipalities, which met 
with strong opposition of the larger municipalities. 
the wake of the 1999 crisis means that the HIPC II funds for poverty reduc-
tion will hardly contribute to this aim and will only serve as a palliative to 
sustain municipal budgets that will receive less transfer funding (coparticipacion 
tributarid) from national tax revenue distribution.68 
As the crisis deepened and real incomes of most the population 
dipped, demands were made that President Banzer step down, among oth-
ers by MNR-leader Sanchez de Lozada. Banzer strongly rejected the idea 
and resolved to end his five-year term. It was not to be. In June 2001 he 
was diagnosed with cancer and, despite initial attempts to cling to power, 
he decided to step down in August 2001.69 Jorge Tuto' Quiroga, who by 
then was barely on speaking terms with Banzer, assumed and announced 
his Twelve Mondi Plan to reactivate the economy, which was basically a 
summary and condensation of the policies in place (debt rescheduling and 
strengthening of financial institutions, distribution of benefits of the cap-
italisation policy, payment of the BOLIVIDA and return of contributions 
to the housing scheme, reprogramming of municipal finances) topped up 
with accelerated spending of revenues from gas exports to Brazil and the 
involvement of micro-enterprises in road-network maintenance. 
That verged on cynicism since at that time a protest movement of 
micro-credit takers had emerged, staging hunger strikes and crucifixions 
and invading the banking superintendency that had failed to monitor the 
micro-credit system. At the superintendency they took a hundred hostages 
in early July to protest the exaggerated interest rates and harsh conditions 
on which micro-credits were accorded by NGOs and banks, often funded 
through official social investment funds ('civil' society involvement in the 
execution of social policies according to World Bank parlance).70 Even 
poverty can be turned into good business. 
68 Control Gudadano, ano 1, num. 1, Noviembre 2001, pp. 8-10. 
69 Of course, his death relaunched the debates on his significance for recent Bolivian 
history, having been president twice, first as a dictator and many years afterwards 
being elected. Most assessments were not wholly positive. To illustrate the polarisa-
tion, it suffices to mention that the Argentinian judge (Rodolfo Canicoba) who had 
asked for his extradition for his role in the 'Condor Operation' in the 1970s, bleakly 
commented that here the trial had ended, whereas others heralded his heroic inter-
vention to prevent Bolivia from falling into communist hands in the 1970s and his 
fulhearted compliance with democratic rule after 1978. On the whole, the legacy 
Banzer left behind triggered mostly sour comments, and one of most conspicuous 
was that in election polls the 'condolence vote' expressed itself in the historical low 
of 3.4 per cent. To manv, he ended as a president who will be remembered for excus-
ing the inexcusable in terms of corruption and prebendalism, and who left no polit-
ical legacy whatsoever worth conmemorating during his democratic 'repechage'. 
70 If the government took initiatives to 'regulate' the NGO sector, they were mainly 
directed against indigenous peoples' advocacy NGOs such as the Santa Cruz-based 
Centro de Kstudios Juridicos e Investigacion Social (CF.JIS), whose representatives 
had been kidnapped and badly beaten up by local catde raisers (CEJIS, 2001, pp. 
150-6); a clear case of blaming the victims. 
An 'authentic panic' rippled through government circles when 
Ombudsman Ana Maria Campero suggested that many of the credit-tak-
ers should be considered as 'dislocated by the customs law' of August 
1999. They had used their credit to buy cheap merchandise from big smug-
glers and thus could make a living, which now had become impossible. The 
government did not want to see the Ombudsman71 involved in this con-
flict between 'private parties'.72 But that was only one of the conflicts that 
made up the 'social convulsions' of the second banzerato. 
IV 
Societal spasms and dialoguing with bullets 
Protests had not been absent during the first years of the Banzer adminis-
tration. An initial 'historic' agreement with the cocaleros soon turned awry 
as the Chapare region was increasingly militarised and the cocaleros under-
took a March For Life, Sovereignty, Land and Coca in August 1998. The 
COB had also staged a series of 'national strikes' to protest economic poli-
cies and pressure for wage increases but, as mentioned, the organisation 
was no more than a phantom of what it used to be. 
The year 2000, however, was a turning point. We will here first review 
the most salient conflict that erupted in that year, as it is suggestive of the 
deficits of the established Bolivian party system and the failure of political 
mediation — a 'representation deficit' — and will help to explain the out-
comes of the 2002 elections. After examining this 'exemplary' conflict over 
water in Cochabamba,73 we will turn to the actors who, connected to that 
conflict or apart from it, emerged as significant challenging actors during the 
1990s. Here, we will first address the roadblocks organised mainly by the 
highland indigenous peasantry, then turn to the conflicts over coca eradica-
tion and finally deal with the conflicts over land and indigenous territories in 
die eastern lowlands. These are, to a large extent, parallel histories: they are 
ignited by other protests, develop synchronically, or pardy overlap. At the 
same time, they compete over primacy, over governments' attention, over 
mobilisation capacity and sometimes clash over demands and priorities. No 
coordination or affinity can be assumed between these actors and their 
actions. But their resemblance consists in their indictment against a state they 
perceive as 'autistic' with regard to the problems they bring to the fore. 
71 The office of Ombudsman had been created subsequent to the 1994 constitutional 
reform that set the stage for reforms of the Judiciary. Ombudsman Ana Maria Campero 
was installed in March 1998 and since then had become a key player in Bolivian politics, 
a point that we will take up later. For an account of smuggling see Salman (2000a). 
72 La Prensa Domingo (17 June 2001). 
73 The Water War' is analysed in detail in Assies (2001 and 2003) and by Nickson and 
Vargas (2002). 
The Water War in Cochabamba and the Coordinadora 
For decades water has been a scarce good in Cochabamba and has triggered 
disputes between die municipality of Cochabamba and the surrounding 
rural areas that were affected by the drilling of deep wells to supply the city 
with water. For decades too, a solution has been on die books: the MISI-
CUNI project that would bring water to the region from the Misicuni catch-
ment area through a system of tunnels and aqueducts and generate electric-
ity on the way. In the minds of most cochabambinos MISICUNI had acquired 
a magic aura over the course of the years and on various occasions they had 
mobilised to pressure for its implementation. It was an expensive project, 
however, and according to the World Bank (1999) a white elephant. 
Nevertheless, alternative solutions proposed by the Sanchez de Lozada 
administration had been rejected by the local population mobilised by die 
Civic Committee and Mayor Manfred Reyes Villa. By the end of his admin-
istration Sanchez de Lozada proposed open bidding for MISICUNI and to 
link this to the privatisation of the inefficient Cochabamba municipal water 
company SEMAPA in order to enhance future profitability. The bidding 
process started under the Banzer government. Some transnational compa-
nies showed an initial interest but backed off after examining the conditions 
and only one consortium, Aguas del Tunari, continued to show interest. 
Instead of opening a new round of bidding the government authorised 
negotiations with this consortium. With the December 1999 municipal elec-
tions upcoming it sought something to show and gave in to most of die con-
ditions posed by the consortium, which meant severely reducing the initial 
project, making the contract terms more flexible and allowing for a stiff 
increase in water tariffs. In September 1999 the contract was signed in die 
presence of President Banzer, Cochabamba's Mayor Manfred Reyes Villa, 
delegates from the Civic Committee and other notables. 
On the other hand, in November the government piloted a law on 
potable water and basic sanitation through Congress, although a General 
Water Law that should provide a framework for such secondary legislation 
was still being debated and controversial. The new law introduced a system 
of 40-year concessions for the areas where water provision could be expect-
ed to be profitable. The granting of such concessions was to be carried out 
by a superintendency, a legacy of the Sanchez de Lozada government that, 
following the guidelines of the multilateral agencies, had introduced these 
entities to regulate sectors likely to constitute natural monopolies. The super-
intendences function as autarchies and relieve the state from direct involve-
ment in resource administration. It was expected that in 41 cities the water 
supply would be rapidly transferred to private concession holders. In fact, 
the law on potable water and basic sanitation thus legalised the contract with 
the Aguas del Tunari Consortium. 
Opposition to the contract first came from middle class sectors such as 
engineers, lawyers and some environmentalists who organised a 
Committee for the Defence of Water and the Popular Economy. They 
questioned the lack of transparency in the negotiations about the contract, 
the fact that the original MISICUNI had been reduced to a bonsai version to 
guarantee profitability, and they argued that the contract allowed for a stiff 
price hike that might reach 180 per cent for some sectors of the population. 
Opposition broadened when the Committee was joined by the factory work-
ers union, the well-organised irrigators from the Cochabamba valley and the 
urban water supply committees that were running cooperative wells since the 
SEMAPA system only covered part of the urban area.74 The new grouping 
adopted the name Coordinadora por la Defensa del Agua y la Vida. 
When water bills started to reach the population in early January 2000 they 
indeed included drastic tariff rises, of up to 150 per cent in some cases, 
although the supporters of the contract, the Civic Committee and govern-
ment officials had always affirmed that the rise would not exceed 40 per cent. 
In fact the population was made to pay in advance for promises about future 
improvement of water provision. At the same time, it became known that die 
contract allowed Aguas del Tunari to install meters on the wells drilled by 
cooperatives and private owners. A protest movement now started in which 
the Coordinadora and the Civic Committee, seeking to regain ground, vied 
for hegemony. This led to a series of protests that met with heavy-handed 
repression by a government that was more concerned with the investment cli-
mate than with the popular economy. Violent street batdes shook the city in 
early January and early February, and came to a climax in early April when a 
youngster was killed, in all likelihood by an army sniper in civilian clothes 75 
The clashes were one of the reasons for the government to declare a 
state of siege on 8 April. On the eve of the state of siege the Church and 
other mediators had arranged for a meeting between the Coordinadora, 
the Civic Committee, municipal officials and a ministerial delegation in the 
Cochabamba Prefecture. However, to the dismay of the mediators, instead 
of the ministers a police force arrived and arrested the Coordinadora del-
egation, which was released again the next day. Throughout the country 
leaders of ongoing protests were arrested and 22 of them were deported 
to San Joaquin, the 'Bolivian Siberia' in the tropical Beni Department. 
Ombudsman Ana Maria Romero filed a habeas corpus appeal to have 
them released because the arrests were illegal, since they were carried out 
before the state of siege had been declared. 
74 Besides such wells, often drilled with the help of NGOs or the Church, tank trucks 
are also important in supplying water to the poorer sectors of the population, which 
to be sure is profitable business. 
75 The government denied that snipers had been at work, even in the face of video 
footage broadcasted by PAT IV, which very clearly showed the contrary. 
The arrests not only failed to defuse the rallies, they also backfired 
because they gave new impetus to the protests, which finally forced the 
government to give in. The contract with the Aguas del Tunari Consortium 
was cancelled, the law on potable water and basic sanitation was substan-
tially modified at short notice and water supply in the city was returned to 
SEMAPA with a new board of directors that included 'independents' with 
links to the Coordinadora. The Coordinadora claimed diat after 15 years of 
defeats for the popular movement it had reversed the tendency and won a 
victory over neoliberalism and transnational capital. It later sought to trans-
form itself into an opposition movement, the Coordinadora de 
Movilizaciones Unica Nacional (COMUNAL), taking up various consumer 
and labour issues. This is suggestive of how the void left by the disarticula-
tion of the COB may be filled by a new type of organisations that no longer 
are strictly rooted in the workplace but also in the neighbourhood.76 
Various features of the Water War episode should be noted. In the first 
place, the manner in which the government ignored early protests, then 
resorted to heavy repression and finally gave in, signing agreements that it 
is not inclined to carry out; a dynamic that Laserna (1999) has charac-
terised as 'forced negotiation'. 
In the second place, and related to the first point, it should be noted 
that the government denied the legitimacy of the Coordinadora as an 
interlocutor. Instead, in the course of the protests the government sought 
to negotiate with the Civic Committee, which — though nominally broad-
based — largely represents the business sector and some notables. This 
attitude was justified by pointing to the articles of the Bolivian 
Constitution that define only the political parties and civic groups with 
'recognised personality' as the legitimate channels of participation. The 
stance of the government with regard to this question is symptomatic of 
a systemic feature of the system. Legislation, as well as the attitudes and 
positions taken by government officials en marge of legislation, express a 
chronic cleavage between the polity and societal voices and demands. 
Downplaying the legitimacy of all objections against government decisions 
that are not formulated by officially recognised entities, 'officialism' time 
and again confirms, in the eyes of societal groupings, its 'extraterrestial' 
position. Protesters, in turn, find out that the only way to make the gov-
ernment 'touch ground' is to pressure it with means that surpass the for-
mally acknowledged channels. This routine is illustrative of a pattern in 
which the non-responsiveness of the polity undermines democratic con-
solidation, because it blocks one fundamental element of such a system: 
the representation of societal worries and heterogeneity in the sphere of 
political deliberation and decision-making. 
76 Kruse (2002). 
The Coordinadora did not have 'recognised personality' but counted 
with widespread support and legitimacy among the population. This is a 
case of what Habermas has called 'public opinion as a fiction of constitu-
tional law'.77 Public opinion that is not channelled according to the con-
stitutional precepts is ignored and may be repressed. However, the gov-
ernment was finally forced to negotiate with the Coordinadora as a result 
of massive and enduring protests, a dynamic that fits Laserna's concept of 
'forced negotiation'. 
Thirdly, one should note that a negotiated resolution was finally 
reached through mediation by Archbishop Tito Solari, the Asamblea 
Permanente de Derechos Humanos de Bolivia (APDHB) and the 
Ombudsman's Office. Political parties did not play any role, which is sug-
gestive of a 'representation deficit'. 
Fourth, the movement was not confined to the urban area. It included 
the irrigators from the Cochabamba valley. The nationwide peasant move-
ment added repeal of the law on potable water and basic sanitation to its 
list of demands, regarded the emerging water legislation as a threat. This 
includes the system of superintendencies, which in operating according 
profitability criteria, tend to favour private enterprise78 and are not subject 
to popular control. The alternative proposed in the case of water is a 
National Water Council that includes consumer representatives. Finally, the 
anger on the part of the protesters, incorporating middle class as well 
working class sectors, over the contract with Aguas del Tunari was not just 
due to the content of the contract, but also to the deceit about the tariff 
hike and beyond that to the lack of transparency in the negotiations in a 
context of widespread government corruption.79 
The Water War' was the most prominent of the protest episodes and 
collisions that confronted the Banzer administration. It is, however, a story 
77 Habermas (1992), p. 237. 
78 Another case in point is the Forestry Superintendency that granted forestry conces-
sions overlapping with indigenous territories that were in the process of being recog-
nised. The case was brought to the attention of the ILO, which, in 1999, issued a 
series of recommendations to make Bolivia comply with Convention 169 on the 
rights of indigenous peoples. 
79 A final element worth mentioning is that in 2002 the Aguas del Tunari Consortium, 
through it's overarching 'mother-enterprise' Bechtel, filed a claim for recompensation 
of the profits it had not been able to cash in at a World Bank tribunal, recurring to 
the so-called Bilateral Investment Treaties, or BITs. Since the Netherlands have such 
a BIT-agreement with Bolivia, the process takes place through the Dutch 'PO-box' 
extension of the company. In Bolivia, the affair has produced indignation since 
Bechtel is claiming approximately US$25 million, an amount that according to many 
is in no way justifiable. Moreover, the proceedings of this tribunal are rather nebu-
lous and information is hard to come by. "The Water War has entered a new phase,' 
stated a Cochabamba-based association trying to influence the process. 
alongside a whole range of similar stories, some running (pardy) parallel 
and some taking place after or before these specific events. Concentrating 
in what follows on the actors and actor-groups rather than on sequences 
of unrest, we will, respectively, address the highland peasants lead by 
Felipe Quispe, the coca farmers whose spokesman is Evo Morales and 
finally the lowland indigenous peoples movement and some other, less 
important protest protagonists. 
The highland peasantry and radicalised Katarism 
States of siege have been decreed frequendv since 1985 to repress protests 
against unpopular, read neoliberal, policies. The April 2001 state of siege, 
however, was the most deadly. It was decreed in the midst of what in 
Bolivia is known as a 'social convulsion'. 
While the Water War in Cochabamba came to a head in early April, peas-
ants initiated the largest wave of peasant protests of the past two decades. 
The day the state of siege was declared 880 police mutinied in La Paz to 
press wage demands. Students also protested in La Paz and later coca-grow-
ers from the Yunga region set up roadblocks to protest against forced erad-
ication. When, on 20 April on the eve of the Easter weekend, the state of 
siege was lifted confrontations had claimed five lives, of which four were 
civilians, three of them peasants. Here we shall focus on the peasant protests 
and discuss the role of Felipe Quispe, El Mallku, who with his Movimiento 
Indigenista Pachacuti gained six per cent of die vote in die 2002 elections. 
The wave of peasant protests was remarkable for being the largest 
peasant protest in two decades and for suggesting a resurgence of the 
Confederacion Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia 
(CSUTCB), which had been passing through an organisational crisis that 
some observers considered potentially terminal. 
The CSUTCB had emerged in 1979 under strong influence of the 
Katarista movement and passed its test of strength in the unprecedented 
peasant resistance against die de facto regimes of General Natusch Bush 
and narco-dictator Garcia Meza. By the late 1980s, however, the Katarista 
movement had increasingly splintered into different political factions.80 The 
election of Katarista leader Victor Hugo Cardenas as vice president in the 
Sanchez de Lozada government (1993-97) led to further erosion of organ-
ised Katarismo. Within the CSUTCB hegemony shifted from the (Aymara-) 
Kataristas to the (Quecha-speaking) coca growers of the Chapare and the 
defence of the 'sacred leaf' from eradication became a major item on the 
CSUTCB agenda.81 These struggles were intertwined with attempts to 
forge a 'political instrument', which materialised in the Asamblea por la 
80 Albo (1994); Cardenas (1988). 
81 Loayza (2000); Ticona (2000). 
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Soberania de los Pueblos (ASP), led by Evo Morales, Alejo Veliz and 
CSUTCB executive Roman Loayza. However, the leadership dispute 
between Evo Morales and Alejo Veliz became evident at die VIII 
CSUTCB Congress in Trinidad in June 1998. It was in this context that lead-
ership shifted to anodier sector within the organisation. At die November 
1998 Congreso de Unidad Campesino in La Paz Felipe Quispe was elected 
executive. The regained strength demonstrated by die CSUTCB in the recent 
actions is often attributed to diis shift widiin die CSUTCB.82 Quispe had pre-
pared his election by patient 'work with the bases'.83 
Felipe Quispe Huanca was born in the Jisk'a Axariya community of the 
Achacachi municipality in 1942 and joined the Movimiento Indio Tupaj 
Katari (MITKA) in the late 1970s. He participated in the foundation of the 
CSUTCB and by the late 1980s had founded the radical Ofensiva Roja de 
Ayllus Tupakataristas.84 Guerrilla activities led to his arrest in 1992. He was 
released without trial in 1997 and joined the peasant movement again. On 
his election as CSUTCB executive in 1998 he took up the tide of Mallku 
(condor), a title of Aymara authority. After his election as CSUTCB exec-
utive Quispe stated that he should be regarded as the chief of the Aymara 
Quechua Nation and in interviews he does not hesitate to express disgust 
with the k'aras (white, mestizo, dominant sectors) or to state that once he 
will be president he will create a Ministry for White Affairs. The earlier 
hegemonic Katarista discourse of the 'pluri-multi' was displaced by an 
ethnicist nationalist variety of the 'two Bolivias'. 
The CSUTCB pliego de reclamos, or package of demands, which was filed 
with the government in October 1998, was a mixed bag covering four main 
themes: lands and territories, political, economic and social issues. 
However, in the course of the mobilisations after April 2000, shifts would 
take place and the ethnic element became more pronounced.85 By early 
April Agriculture Minister Oswaldo Antezana claimed that 75 per cent of 
the demands were being attended but he forgot that the remaining 25 per 
cent constitute key demands such as the joint elaboration of a Sovereignty 
Plan, monitoring of ministries, a peasant bank, an agrarian university, 
immediate titling of indigenous areas and direct administration of pro-
tected areas. In March the CSUTCB had agreed to start actions by April. 
By then the water issue had become explosive and suspension of the 
General Water Law project moved up on the list of demands. 
82 Patzi Paco (1999), p. 121. 
83 Putso, no. 39, p. 21; Putso, no. 40, p. 8; Patzi Paco(1999). 
84 For an insight into the mind-frame of Ofensiva Roja see Calla, Pinelo and Urioste 
(1989), pp. 298-312. 
85 This is very well documented in an excellent analysis by Caji'as (2001), on which this 
section relies in good part. 
Peasant roadblocks started on 3 April in the Departments of La Paz, 
Oruro, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Tarija. Mostly these are simple 
affairs: 'sow' sufficient medium size stones across the road so that cars 
have to slow down or cannot pass at all, then mount guard and build a fire 
to keep warm. The military failed in attempts to control the main roads 
and by 5 April the Departments of Beni and Potosi had joined the actions. 
The arrest of Felipe Quispe in La Paz on 7 April and his deportation to 
San Joaquin only added another issue to the agenda: the liberation of El 
Mallku. The city of La Paz started to run out of chicken and vegetables 
and, fuelled by Quispe's rhetoric, the imagery of the late eighteenth-cen-
tury siege of the city by Tupac Amaru and the nineteenth-century rising 
led by Zarate Willka cropped up in the minds of many pacenos. 
The peasant-indigenous protests led to a violent confrontation in the 
locality of Achacachi on 9 April, leading to the death of two peasants and 
an army captain. In an attempt to depict the Aymara inhabitants of 
Achacachi as irrationally violent and cruel Defence Minister Jorge Crespo 
and army sources claimed that Captain Omar Tellez had not only been beat-
en to death but also had been quartered and that his eyes had been torn out, 
claims that would later be denied by die director of the local hospital and by 
Ombudsman Ana Maria Romero, who denounced the abusive actions of the 
military and noted that Captain Tellez had been the first to shoot to kill.86 
Negotiations between a CSUTCB delegation and a government dele-
gation started on 11 April after mediation by the Church, the APDHB 
and the national Ombudsman. From the viewpoint of the CSUTCB del-
egation they were at best negotiations over the conditions to negotiate, 
that is the liberation of the detained, including El Mallku. As noted, by 
then Ombudsman Ana Maria Romero had filed a habeas corpus appeal in 
order to liberate the detained. On 14 April the CSUTCB and government 
delegates finally signed an agreement. It stipulated the immediate release 
of El Mallku, ratified agreements on CSUTCB demands from October 
1998, determined trade-union participation in the elaboration of a 
General Water Law, regulation of agrarian legislation, the formation of 
commissions to resolve various problems and compensation for the 
wounded and the families of the dead. The government should carry out 
the agreement within 90 days. If not, roads would be blocked again. Upon 
his release Felipe Quispe, whose arrest had only contributed to his 
renown, commented that the CSUTCB delegates who signed the agree-
ment would have to respond for what they signed. He had not. The peas-
ant protests had only been a preview of what could come, he declared, 
and he invoked the possibility of an alliance with military sectors like in 
Ecuador; 'I will be back in September,' he stated. In this way he not only 
86 La Prensa, 5 June 2000. 
astutely harked back to Tupaj Katari's last words when he was quartered 
in 1781, 'I will come back and I will be millions'87 but also announced 
what came to be known as 'Black September' and what for El Mallku was 
a 'second test' in promoting Aymara—Quechua nationalism.88 
Quispe's announcement not only reflected the agricultural cycle — 
sowing taking place in August — but also the lack of confidence that the 
government would really comply with the earlier agreement,89 an idea that, 
again, fits with Laserna's (1999) concept of forced negotiation. What 
nobody, including Quispe, could foresee was that September 2000 would 
be another moment of 'social convulsion', surpassing April. 
In September trouble started when teachers demanded a 50 per cent 
salary rise and the government laconically stated that this was out of the 
question for lack of funds. While that conflict escalated, the coca growers 
of the Chapare initiated roadblocks to protest against forced eradication 
and militarisation. With these two conflicts well on the way, the CSUTCB 
broke off negotiations with the government on 13 September saying that 
the latter was not complying with the April agreements, but also taking 
advantage of a moment of extreme weakness of the 'mega'. El Mallku 
installed his Estado Mayor in Achacachi and throughout the highlands roads 
were littered with stones. Meanwhile, in the lowlands a border dispute 
between die Santa Cruz and Cochabamba departments triggered road-
blocks, the public health sector went on strike and other sectors joined the 
fray. By the end of September some ten different conflicts were ongoing. 
Food scarcity began to be felt in the cities and by the end of September 
food had to be flown to La Paz. The government sent thousands of mili-
tary and police to repress the roadblocks, but despite making a significant 
number of victims,90 they were helpless in the face of strategies like 
Quispe's Plan Pulga (Plan Flea) of wildcat roadblocks. 
Amidst mounting demands that Banzer resign, as he turned out to be 
the 'dictator of old' and exponent of 'dialogue with bullets', the govern-
ment started to negotiate the different conflicts. Mediators arranged a 
meeting between El Mallku and a delegation of ministers set for 1 October 
in the CARITAS offices in La Paz. Some days before the meeting was due, 
however, the army and air force attacked a gathering of peasants in die 
township of Huarani, leaving three dead. The meeting in the CARITAS 
offices soon was over. Quispe arrived with tears in his eyes, delivered an 
infuriated harangue, and walked out: 
87 See also Quispe (1999), p.116. 
88 Occasionally other indigenous peoples of the lowlands are also mentioned, but rela-
tions, as we shall sec, are somewhat tense. 
89 Cajias (2001). 
90 By the end of September the number of dead amounted to at least 15 and some hun-
dred people had been wounded. 
We have received you, we gave you our territory, we lodged you 
strangers, and now? Now you kill us, butchers! Why don't you kill me 
now? Why do you kill my Quechua brothers? Why do you kill my Aymara 
brethren? Why? I want to know the answer. The only crime we commit-
ted is to ask for justice and liberty; our only offence is to claim that you 
return us our political power. Murderers! Why do you kill us? The people 
want to know, the world needs to know. It hurts me to look at you blood-
thirsty people stained with Indian blood. (...) I am not going to look you 
in the eyes, because your eyes are stained with Indian blood. I am not 
going to look at your faces, because they are bathed in indigenous blood. 
As a Mallku Major this hurts me. I am not a political pongo (servant). It 
hurts me because you, tenants, have appropriated our lands.91 
The ministerial delegation, Guiteras (Presidency), Lupo (Economic 
Development), Vasquez (Labor) and Antezana (Agriculture) was stunned. 
Never had an Indian dared to address them like that. Guiteras comment-
ed that El Mallku is ca man who does not recognise the country, who does 
not recognise our national anthem and who in his book even uses adjec-
tives against the Catholic Church'.92 
Negotiations started, however, and on 8 October the government 
accepted the full list of 50 demands elaborated by the CSUTCB. The 
agreement included the repeal of water legislation, the revision of agrari-
an legislation, the withdrawal of biodiversity law projects, various social 
demands and the implementation of a peasant-friendly rural development 
policy. A panicked government produced decree after decree and elevated 
the Vice Ministry of Indigenous and Originary People's Affairs to the rank 
of a Ministry for Peasant, Indigenous and Originary People.93 Meanwhile, 
in November Quispe created his own 'political instrument', the 
Movimiento Indigenista Pachacuti (MIP) and never stopped menacing 
with new mobilisations and in April 2001 he set a date: the first of May. 
Other sectors, such as the coca growers and COMUNAL, saw this as 
an opportunity to press their deferred demands and started to prepare for 
the May convulsion, initiating marches to arrive in La Paz on time. By that 
91 The speech is reproduced in an interview with Felipe Quispe (2001). 
92 La Prensa, 2 October 2000. 
93 The ministry came to be occupied by a candidate indicated by Felipe Quispe, 
Wigberto Rivero, linked to the MIR. Me also received the support of Marcial 
Fabricano, the controversial leader of the lowland indigenous organisation CIDOB 
and the Confederation of Colonists, but not from the Santa Cruz-based indigenous 
organisation CPESC, which, as we shall see, played an important role in the 
Indigenous and Peasant March for Land Territory and Natural Resources of 
June-July 2000. According to Felipe Quispe, he had put forward Wigberto Rivero 
because no Aymara or Quechua was disposed to take a post in the Banzer govern-
ment (personal communication, 7 October 2002, Mexico). 
time, however, the CSUTCB was deeply divided. A 'Unity Congress' had 
taken place in January in Oruro. Although neither Felipe Quispe nor Evo 
Morales was present, their factions clashed, leaving one person dead, and the 
congress gave rise to a parallel CSUTCB, headed by Humberto Choque and 
sympathetic to Evo Morales. In late April Quispe staged a 'Unity Congress' 
of his own in La Paz. After being duly elected and having 'expelled' Evo 
Morales from his CSUTCB, Quispe toned down his rhetoric and postponed 
the mobilisation he had announced at the last moment. Meanwhile, the 
police and army had succeeded in dispersing the coca growers marching on 
La Paz, while a reduced number of COMUNAL marchers managed to reach 
the city but met with little support. The announced mobilisation seemed to 
have petered out and Quispe was accused of being a traitor and having con-
nections widi government party MIR. 
Nonetheless, when the government sent troops to the Yunga region of 
La Paz to eradicate coca, El Mallku declared that one of the points of the 
October 2000 agreement was being violated and initiated roadblocks in the 
highland region. Although this was a nuisance and damaged the tourism 
industry in the area, the government paid little attention and even felt itself 
in a position to send Quispe an ultimatum threatening to arrest him for 
sedition. Troops would clear the roads, starting 13 July That was a huge 
miscalculation. One word from El Mallku sufficed to mobilise around 
25,000 peasants who massively resisted the army and forced it to withdraw, 
committing abuses against peasants during their retreat, which led to new 
denunciations by the Ombudsman. State authorities were ousted from 
many communities, creating virtually 'liberated territories'. On top of that, 
a few days later Quispe, Evo Morales, COMUNAL leader Oscar Oliveira 
and Yunga cocalero leader Dionisio Nunez were photographed happily 
shaking hands after having concluded a pact of mutual support against 
neoliberalism. The government was pushed on the defensive again and 
peasant demands now went well beyond the earlier lists, including the 
repeal of DS 21060 and of Law 1008 on coca eradication, as well as the 
1996 agrarian legislation, the Ley INRA. According to various ministers 
such demands could not possibly be met. Nevertheless, on 23 August the 
Acta de Pucarani was signed, which included clauses on agrarian legislation 
and Law 1008. Ethnic demands had become far more pronounced this 
time and were reflected in proposals to declare 21 June, the Andean New 
Year Inti Raymi, a national holiday and to create an indigenous university. 
The act also promised to distribute 3.8 million hectares amongst the peas-
antry, to initiate a US$47 million Integral Development Programme for die 
La Paz Department, to buy 1,000 tractors and to initiate an US$11 million 
micro-credit programme for peasants and small producers. The govern-
ment was given 90 days to comply with the Act. 
After this 'third test' the highland region remained relatively calm, how-
ever, until in January 2002 Evo Morales was expelled from Parliament, a 
point to which we return below. The CSUTCB, holding a congress in 
Sucre, ordered roadblocks in solidarity with Morales and again the roads in 
the highlands were littered with stones. After that, attention shifted to the 
political process and the demand for a Constituent Assembly instead of a 
mere reform of the Constitution, brokered by the political parties. 
As we have seen, El Mallku has been able to create a strong support 
base among the rural communities of the La Paz Department and with his 
confrontational style has given voice to the resentment of a marginalised 
population through a new radicalised nationalist discourse, which particu-
larly has boosted Aymara pride among his supporters. Through the 
CSUTCB the attention of mobilisations has been refocused on the plight 
of the rural highland population. On the other hand, however, this radical 
brand of Katarism also resonates among sectors of the urban population 
of, for example, El Alto, a population that earlier responded to the appeal 
of Carlos Palenque and Max Fernandez, the founders of CONDEPA and 
UCS, respectively.94 While political Katarism always seemed to be doomed 
to insignificance, and never won more than two per cent of the vote, the 
MIP has emerged as an important political force. 
The coca-growers and the Movimiento al Socialismo 
As already noted, the party that came second in the 2002 elections also has 
its roots in CSUTCB-linked peasant organisations of the mostly Quechua-
speaking coca growers of the Chapare, who turned the struggle against 
eradication programmes into a major item on the CSUTCB agenda. Coca 
growing in this region does not have a long history. It grew spectacularly 
fast under Banzer's first de facto regime (1971-78) and in the 1980s. 
Whereas the military at the time were heavily involved in the cocaine cir-
cuit, there is no evidence that the peasant producers are involved in organ-
ised crime. Although not a traditional coca-growing region, it has emerged 
as a combative one. Under the leadership of people like Evo Morales, the 
farmers constituted a well-organised group, desperate enough to fiercely 
defend their newly acquired livelihood after having migrated to the region 
as low agricultural yields on the Altiplano and mass lay-offs in the mining 
branch forced them to develop another survival strategy. 
94 These two parties had emerged in the late 1980s and can be characterised as neo-pop-
ulist. Although these parties posed a challenge to the established party system domi-
nated by the ADN, MIR and MNR, they soon were incorporated into the dynamics of 
pact making. CONDEPA, in particular, relied on anti-neoliberal rhetoric and a politi-
sation of ethnic fissures. For a discussion of these parties see Mayorga (2002). 
In contrast to other countries' resistance against eradication policies 
have taken the form of trade union and political action.95 Peasants are 
organised in six federations and in the mid-1990s forged a 'political 
instrument', the Asamblea por la Soberania de los Pueblos (ASP), led by 
Evo Morales, Alejo Veliz and CSUTCB executive Roman Loayza. The new 
organisation first showed its electoral strength in the 1995 municipal elec-
tions, in which it won 11 elections for mayor and 47 municipal council 
seats in its home base Cochabamba.96 In the 1997 general elections it 
gained four uninominal97 national deputies on the Izquierda Unida ticket, 
among them Morales and Loayza. Morales achieved 70 per cent of the vote 
in the Chapare electoral district, which made him die best-voted uninomi-
nal deputy.98 After the 1998 leadership dispute Alejo Veliz stayed with the 
remainder of the ASP while Evo Morales adhered to the Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS). In the 1999 municipal elections, after the rift, ASP 
emerged with 28 municipal councillors and five mayors in Cochabamba. 
MAS won 79 council seats nationwide, of which 40 were in Cochabamba,99 
where it also won six mayorships. In a national perspective such outcomes 
correspond to about three per cent of the vote, far from the 20.9 per cent 
that brought Morales only one step from the presidency in 2002. Although 
Morales, who is of Aymara origin, during these last years symbolised the 
resistance against Banzer's policy to eradicate 'redundant' (cocaine-suspect) 
coca,100 we shall show this was not exacdy what propelled him and the 
MAS to second place among the political forces in the country. 
One of the few 'achievements' claimed by the Banzer government was 
the substantial reduction of coca production in Bolivia — the other, 
unclaimed but perhaps more genuine, achievement being die appointment 
of an Ombudsman. Whereas in 1997 it was estimated that some 38,000 
hectares were growing coca, by 2001 estimates ranged from 3,000 to 6,000. 
Over the past five years the 'war on coca' has claimed over 50 dead and 
500 wounded, while about 400 people were detained under Law 1008 of 
1988 on coca and controlled substances, a law that is absolutely at odds 
with the human rights regime.101 
Initially, in October 1997, the Chapare coca-growers had decided to 
cooperate with voluntary eradication, but things changed when in January 
95 Albo (2003). 
96 Yaksic and Tapia (1997), pp. 166, 175. 
97 Following the 1994 constitutional reform 68 uninominal districts had been intro-
duced by 1996. The remaining 62 seats in the Chamber of Deputies are filled through 
nationwide proportional vote. 
98 Yaksic and Tapia (1997), p. 211. 
99 Van Cott (2003). 
100 Albo (2003). 
101 For a discussion of policy development see Laserna (1996: 1998). 
1998 the government made public its Plan Dignidad. As usual under the 
banzerato the Plan had four 'pillars': alternative development, prevention 
and rehabilitation, eradication of illegal and redundant coca and interdic-
tion. For the 1998-2002 period US$952 million was budgeted, of which 
US$700 million would be destined to alternative development. In early 
February, in the context of the new strategy and bilateral agreements with 
the USA Banzer tacitly authorised the 'amplified' involvement of the 
armed forces in the war against drugs. The Chapare prepared resistance to 
the Plan. Conditions for dialogue deteriorated when in March the govern-
ment announced that the economic compensation for eradication of a 
hectare of coca would be reduced from US$2,500 to US$1,650. In April, 
repression of roadblocks in the Chapare claimed its first victims among 
the peasantry and the region was increasingly militarised under the pretext 
that armed groups were operating there. Militarisation went together with 
human rights abuse, unjustified detentions, torture, violation of women 
and theft by the military. Meanwhile, the alternative development policies 
produced more glossy folders and large newspaper ads than tangible ben-
efits for the peasantry. By the year 2000 confrontations had claimed the 
lives of 11 peasants and six police. 
When in September of that year the CSUTCB roadblocks started, the 
cocaleros seized the occasion to press their own demands and to protest at 
the government's intention to construct three new military barracks in the 
Chapare. Besides better conditions for the marketing of the alternative 
development products they also demanded to be allowed to cultivate a cato 
(1,600 square metres) of coca per family. While in the first weeks of 
October the other conflicts ended in negotiations, the conflict in the 
Chapare dragged on and escalated. Various police and eradicators were 
ambushed and killed and the government accused Evo Morales of being 
the intellectual author of the crimes and called for his parliamentary 
immunity to be lifted, although it never managed to provide substantial 
proof to sustain the accusation.102 One of the cocalero leaders who was 
arrested on the charge had to be released again when it became absolutely 
clear that she could not have been at the place of the crime. Morales, for 
his part, suggested that the killings might well have been provocations to 
justify militarisation, a version that gained credibility when, in November, 
2001 it became clear that a special irregular parallel force of between 1,000 
and 2,000 'mercenaries' had been recruited to carry out a 'dirty war' on 
drugs. The Ombudsman had another case. 
Meanwhile, in December 2000 the government had declared that it had 
achieved its aim of coca cero in the Chapare. That was immediately ques-
102 Nor has it ever been able to substantiate Morales's alleged links to the cocaine mafia 
(Albo, 2003). 
tioned and gave rise to quite some haggling about how much was left. 
Thus 'Plan Dignity' ended in endless quarrels over how much was eradi-
cated, how much was left and how well the programmes for alternative 
crops and compensation for the farmers were doing; the Plan claimed vari-
able numbers of dead each year it was in existence and finally became 
'enduring eradication', as 600 acres left at one time turned out to be 6,000 
the next month. Violent confrontation again took place in the last months 
of 2001 and in November five peasants were killed in the suppression of 
roadblocks and 30 women allegedly were raped by members of the mili-
tary Information Minister Mauro Bertero commented that the rape was 
the 'product of the intolerance of the cocaleros'. 
At that time, President Quiroga, under pressure from the US Embassy 
sharpened the anti-coca policies and named an 'anti drugs Tsar'. The gov-
ernment stubbornly stuck to its fundamentalist obsession with 'coca cero' in 
the Chapare and on the basis of two decrees of November 2001 decided 
to control all transport of coca leaf and to close the legal market for coca 
in Sacaba on 15 January 2002.103 The provocation led to a violent con-
frontation over the next few days.104 Twenty-five drugs control agency cars 
were set alight, three peasants and two soldiers were killed in the con-
frontations and a few days later two soldiers were brutally murdered. 
It was another murky killing that provided President Quiroga with the 
opportunity to demand the lifting of Evo Morales's parliamentary immu-
nity. After a summary trial by the 'ethical commission' 104 of the 130 
members of the Chamber of Deputies voted for the 'definitive separa-
tion' of Morales, which meant his virtual 'eradication' from the political 
scene. He lost not only his immunity but also his popular mandate. ADN 
Lower House member and former minister Fernando Kieffer, himself 
immune from prosecution over various corruption cases, made quite clear 
that the objective was to eliminate the political and trade union mouth-
piece of the cocalero movement.105 
The majority that had voted against Morales did not expect there to be 
any significant consequences; 'nothing, absolutely nothing will happen,' 
stated Fernando Kieffer. He could not have been more mistaken. After 
four years of Banzerism the government and most of die political class 
were widely, and with very good reason, perceived as utterly corrupt and 
arrogantly contemptuous of most of the population. When Morales was 
expelled from Congress people felt deeply offended and humiliated by a 
103 The Sacaba market is rather insignificant in comparison to the La Paz market, but it is 
an important outlet for the few tons of legal leaves produced by the Chapare peasantry. 
Due to eradication policies the quantity of leaves sold was reduced by 90 per cent and 
turnover dropped from around Bs 20,000,000 in 1997 to Bs 6,000,000 in 2001. 
104 P/ftso, 18-24 |anuarv 2002. 
105 Pnlso, 25-3 l 'lanuary 2002. 
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political class that staged a sham process against one of them and, more-
over, it was felt that they had dared to do that because Morales was an 
Indian. The racist contempt of the governing class came back on them like 
a boomerang. The usually divided factions of the peasant movement 
closed ranks. The CSUTCB of Felipe Quispe, in Congress in Sucre, called 
for roadblocks, the cocaleros of the Yungas did the same, and those of the 
Chapare marched to Cochabamba where Morales was on a hunger strike 
in the offices of the Workers Union. They camped on the campus of the 
Cochabamba University from which they marched daily to the central 
square to salute Morales. Once again the city became the scene of violent 
confrontations between protesters and police forces. On 6 February 
Fernando Kieffer had to admit that 'The country is living a dramatic situ-
ation that gets more complicated by the minute'.106 
Two days later the government and Evo Morales reached an agreement. 
Basic points were that the decrees on coca leaf drying and transportation 
would be suspended and that a new scheme for the commercialisation of 
legal coca was to be worked out between the parties. Evo Morales's polit-
106 Pu/so, 8—14 February 2002. 
ical and trade union rights would be respected and the Church and the 
APDHB would start a procedure with the Constitutional Tribunal to annul 
Morales's expulsion from the Chamber of Deputies. The government 
would also attend the claims of a variety of other movements and respect 
the agreements that had been reached with Felipe Quispe.107 
One question Morales raised was how much the US Embassy had paid 
for all the 'ethical' votes against him. In fact, besides popular outrage 
against the government and the political class and the discontent with 
neoliberal policies, which Morales had always vehemendy opposed, US 
Embassy meddling in Bolivian politics was extremely helpful in propelling 
him to his electoral victory. His rise in pre-election polls worried die US 
ambassador to such an extent that a few days before the elections he warned 
Bolivians — after affirming that it was a free and independent country — 
not to vote for Morales if they did not want to lose US support.108 His 
statements only served to boost Morales from fourth to second place and, 
when election results began confirming die landslide, Morales jeered that he 
could not have wished himself a better campaign leader. 
Other emergent actors 
While we have hitherto focused on the highland region and the 
Cochabamba Department we here will briefly discuss the indigenous peo-
ple's movement of the eastern lowlands and the movement of landless 
peasants that emerged in 2000, as wrell as a very different movement stak-
ing ethnic claims: the Nacion Camba. 
At the end of June 2000 indigenous people and peasants from the low-
lands undertook their Third March,109 under the banner of 'Land, 
Territories and Natural Resources'. The march was provoked by a Supreme 
Decree issued in October 1999 that allowed former rubber estates in the 
northern Bolivian Amazon region — now dedicated to die production of 
Brazil nuts and timber — to be converted into new concessions under the 
1996 Forestry Law.110 This decree was clearly a favour to die ADN-linked 
107 La Prettsa, 9 February 2002. 
108 For a suggestive analysis on the increasing interlinking of geopolitical interests and 
the motives behind 'developmental assistence', see Duffield (2001). 
109 Over 30 indigenous peoples have been identified in the Bolivian lowlands, totalling 
some 220,000 persons. The First March had taken place in 1990 under the banner 
'Dignity and Territory' to protest the abuses of forestry companies in areas occupied 
bv indigenous peoples. For the first time, this widely publicised march made the 
indigenous peoples of the lowlands Visible' and then President Paz Zamora signed a 
series of decrees recognising indigenous territories. Bolivia also ratified ILO 
Convention 169. A Second March took place in 1996 to press indigenous demands 
to be incorporated in the new agrarian legislation, under the banner 'Land and 
Territory' (Albo, 1994; Assies, 2000; Van Cott, 2000). 
110 For a detailed analysis see Assies (2002). 
politicians of the region. After it was issued the Agrarian Superintendency 
calculated the claims staked by the estate owners, which are based on 'cus-
tomary rights', or rather the law of the jungle. It concluded that if these 
claims were to be honoured there would be hardly any land left for peas-
ant and indigenous communities. Given the potential for conflict, the 
superintendency suggested that the property rights of communities and 
others should be clarified before proceeding with any 'conversion', but its 
warning fell on deaf ears. In April 2000 an 18-point Peasant-Indigenous 
Manifesto was launched, which in June was followed by a 31-point plat-
form of demands, to be pressed for with the Third March. A few days later 
the Ombudsman demanded that the decree be declared anti-constitution-
al. While the decree was the principal issue that triggered the march, con-
flicts over indigenous territories and peasant lands in the Santa Cruz region 
and the Gran Chaco of Tarija also figured on the list of demands. 
The march started in the end of June with the aim of participating in 
the Great National Assembly of Indigenous Peoples (GANPI) that was to 
take place in Santa Cruz under the auspices of the lowland indigenous 
organisation CIDOB. The CIDOB leadership,111 however, brokered a deal 
with a government delegation that caused dissident factions to continue 
their march, this time heading for La Paz by way of Cochabamba. 
Government panicked at the prospect of them being joined by cocaleros and 
other malcontents and sent a delegation of ministers that finally gave in to 
most of the demands and signed an agreement in the township of 
Montero on 16 July. The decree was repealed, clarification of property 
rights in the northern Amazon region and the Gran Chaco should be con-
cluded within a year, the titling of indigenous territories (tierras comunitarias 
de origen, TCOs) in Santa Cruz and other areas would be speeded up and 
procedures of titling in favour of indigenous peoples, peasants and 
colonists would be simplified.112 
Rather than complying with the agreement, however, the government 
sought new ways to allow for the conversion of the old rubber estates and 
dragged its feet where clarifying ownership rights in the Gran Chaco was 
concerned. What is more, in September 2001 the government signed an 
agreement with the Camara Agropecuaria del Oriente (CAO) that was 
absolutely contrary to the agreement signed in Montero. One of its most 
scandalous clauses was that it promised a Supreme Decree on the 'animal 
charge' for land in the lowlands, the CAO pressuring to allow extensions 
between six and 47 hectares per animal.113 It was commented bitterly that 
in Bolivia it would be better to be a cow than a human being. 
111 Headed by the controversial Marcial Fabricano, who was to become a vice-minister 
in the new Sanchez de Lozada government. 
112 Assies (2002), CEJIS (2000) 
113 CEJIS (2001). 
The lack of action in the Gran Chaco contributed to the eruption of 
violence in the region when, in November 2001, the Pantani setdement of 
landless peasants, near Yacuiba, was attacked by alleged paramilitary 'peas-
ants with land'. Seven people died, among them one of the attackers. This 
is only one example of the increasingly violent response of landowners to 
the Movimiento Sin Tierra (MST) that had emerged in May 2000. Not only 
have setdements been attacked, but NGOs representing indigenous and 
peasant interests have also come under attack from landowners and catde 
ranchers, as well as from the Banzer government, which dedicated much 
effort to 'regulating' NGO activity as regards the more critical NGOs.114 
The climate for such attacks has been created by the lack of progress 
in implementing the 1996 agrarian legislation and by organisations such as 
the Comite Pro Santa Cruz, the CAO and the virulendy right-wing Santa 
Cruz-based regionalist movement Nacion Camba, which emerged in early 
2001 and claims to represent not only Santa Cruz, but the whole eastern 
lowland region. This movement claims that the cambas (the mestizo low-
land population) is an 'emerging nation' based on 'tradition, blood and eth-
nic-cultural unity'. It calls for the defence of eastern Bolivia against the 
highland kollas who invade their lands and speaks of an Aymara 'occupa-
tion police'. The movement claims self-determination as a nation-state.115 
However, it cannot be said to be sympathetic to the indigenous peoples of 
the lowlands. Nacion Camba is thus a new manifestation of cruceno region-
alism, which cannot be suspected of much sympathy for lowland indige-
nous groups or, for diat matter, for camba landless peasant movements, 
which have encountered violent reactions on die part of large landowners in 
recent times. The movement essentially claims the lowlands for the domi-
nant mestizo population or, more precisely, the mestizo dominant class. 
The tensions described here are a further indication of the extent to 
which the 1996 agrarian and forestry legislation failed to resolve the prob-
lems in die lowland region.116 At the same time this legislation did not 
address the problems in the highlands at all.117 The agrarian question in both 
these regions has, as we have seen, prompted the emergence of new move-
ments.118 Together widi the other movements described, and notwidistand-
ing the tensions among them and dieir frequent failure to cooperate, diese 
114 Ibid. 
115 Sandoval (2001). 
116 Assies (2002). 
117 Urioste and Pacheco (2000). 
118 In October 2001 the Bolivian government convoked an 'Earth Summit', which later 
was renamed 'Encounter' as expectations were reduced because the conditions for 
resolving problems had worsened after the Pantani massacre. The principal peasant 
organisations did not participate in the encounter and announced that they would 
convoke a summit of their own. 
movements stand for what some, perhaps somewhat exaltedly, have dubbed 
'the return of plebeian Bolivia'.119 Undeniably, however, a new political con-
stellation has emerged. It is time to have a closer look at the Bolivian politi-
cal system and how it fared during the last few years. 
V 
Systemics and anti-systemics: a party system in turmoil 
The protests described above did not simply lead to political parties as a 
logical follow-up. They were, however, the decisive forces behind the oblit-
eration of the established party spectrum and, as such, the new parties can 
be seen as rejections of the system as it used to operate and as represen-
tatives of voices that no longer accepted the deception of vote-issuing as 
they had known it. Which of course is still a long way from appropriating 
an acknowledged place in the party spectrum or having developed the 
force to substantially correct the deficits of the party system. Here we will 
briefly look at the evolution of the Bolivian party system and then focus 
on how it performed under the second banzerato. 
Three parties, the MNR, ADN and MIR, have been at the core of the 
political party system that emerged in 1985, after the coalition government 
led by the left-wing Union Democratica Popular under Siles Suazo. By the 
late 1980s, however, two new forces had emerged: CONDEPA and 
UCS.120 These two parties, founded by the La Paz-based media figure 
Carlos Palenque and the Santa Cruz-based beer magnate Max Fernandez, 
respectively, heralded a new form of populism. Their founders — both 
cself-made' men — appealed to the urban cholo population, and Palenque 
was particularly popular among the cholas. Additionally, MBL — a centre-
left breakaway from the MIR — emerged briefly in the 1993 elections. 
These elections resulted in a new constellation. Whereas until then the 
game of coalition making had been played among the three 'traditional' 
players in alternating partnerships, the ADN and MIR were both now rel-
egated to the opposition. The new coalition revolved around the MNR, 
which had achieved an exceptionally strong vote, with the MBL, UCS and 
MRTK-L as minor coalition partners. Victor Hugo Cardenas, far exceed-
ing the popularity of his party (MRTK-L), became vice-president. 
By 1997 the founders of the new populist parties had both died — 
Max Fernandez in a plain crash and Carlos Palenque from a heart attack. 
As noted, after the elections Hugo Banzer brokered the megacoalition that 
brought him to the presidency: the ADN, MIR, CONDEPA, UCS and the 
NFR of Cochabamba's Mayor Manfred Reyes Villa, who had started his 
119 Garcia et al. (2000); Spedding (2001). 
120 For technical reasons the UCS did not participate in the 1989 elections. For a discus-
sion of these neo-populist parties see Mayorga (2002). 
career under Banzer's patronage,121 jumped on the bandwagon. Haggling 
over power shares started immediately and president Banzer and his 
entourage repeatedly had to call on the partners to respect the president. 
CONDEPA, which after Palenque's death had begun to disintegrate, with 
various factions fighting over the remnants, was expelled from the coali-
tion in August 1998. The next party to leave, or rather to be expelled, was 
the NFR. Although the party was fully responsible for the MISICUNI 
contract, including the price hike, in the midst of the Water War raging in 
its home base it chose to criticise the hike. In a flurry of mutual accusa-
tions the NFR left the 'mega' in February 2000. 
What remained was not a particularly stable or coherent ensemble 
either. When celebrating his seventy-fourth birthday in May 2000 President 
Banzer turned to the ministers and officials that had gathered for the occa-
sion and said that he 'preferred a grain of loyalty over a ton of intelli-
gence'. That reflected quite well his governing mentality, which was rather 
detrimental to government itself. The MIR was a highly ambiguous coali-
tion partner. In times of crisis Jaime Paz would dress up in an overall to 
push wheelbarrows to help out road construction in El Alto, telling any-
body who would hear it that being in 'mega' did not imply sharing respon-
sibility. For the UCS one good reason for staying in the coalition was that 
in that way the Fernandez family would not have to pay an outstanding tax 
debt incurred by its breweries. The ADN was divided into dinosaurios, 
Banzer's old cronies from the 1971 coup and the like, and pitufos (chicks, 
career politicians) grouped around Jorge Quiroga. Quiroga was frequendy 
accused of plotting against Banzer and by the time Banzer stepped down 
the two could barely shake hands. In between the two factions there was a 
group of pitosaimos, led by Fernando Kieffer. 
One of die issues at stake between dinosaurios and pitufos is the future of 
the ADN, which had been founded in 1979 in the wake of die Banzer dicta-
torship (1971-78) to participate in the upcoming elections and to assure 
Banzer's future immunity from any trial of responsibility. After the 1997 elec-
tions Banzer became president, the only ex-dictator to achieve such a feat. For 
Banzer and his entourage diis was the main objective of die party, a last 
chance to savour power and also be celebrated as democrats. The younger 
generation of the ADN is more concerned about the future and, in clear con-
trast to the conspiratorial old guard, is more technocratic in its oudook. 
Quiroga is a rather technocratic neoliberal hard-liner who does not hesitate 
to implement policies by force. Banzer, on the other hand, in his later years 
was somewhat more hesitant about the use of force since diis would damage 
his credentials as a dictator turned democrat. After Quiroga took over gov-
ernment, in a few mondis the number of deaths due to repression soon 
121 Mavorga (1997), pp. 129-224. 
exceeded the, by no means negligible, total during the four years of 
Banzerism. Quiroga also was the first Bolivian president to install a comput-
er in his office. The vox populi commented that he was the first Bolivian to 
govern by chip, allegedly implanted during a surgical operation in the USA. 
While the dinosaurios were Banzer's 'inner circle', there furthermore was 
an inner 'inner circle', the Banzer-Prada axis. The Banzer-Prada families 
took charge of the customs service, and the diplomatic service was filled 
with nieces, nephews and other members of the clan. Another famous case 
is Luis 'Chito' Valle Urena, married to Banzer's daughter and personal secre-
tary Patricia. 'Chito' Valle, already with quite a trajectory of dubious deals, was 
appointed prefect of the La Paz Department, and during the two and a half 
years of his administration managed to accumulate a fair list of what have 
been baptised chitocasos-. the chitochatarra involved the auctioning of cars of the 
Prefecture as if they were scrap iron, the cbitodeposito the depositing of public 
funds in a private bank account, the chitocarreteras the overpricing of road-con-
struction, etc. As an 'honourable deputy' Luis Valle benefits from parliamen-
tary immunity. And he is not alone. In October 1998 Health Minister Tonchy 
Marinkovic (MIR) was hesitandy dismissed after the press had denounced the 
purchase of 'overpriced' vaccines. Though responsibilities were established 
no measures were taken. Industry and Commerce Minister Leopoldo Lopez 
(MIR) was dismissed in April 1999 after irrefutable proof had been present-
ed on his involvement with smuggling Argentine meat. His party 'licensed' 
him until the case could be cleared up but by January 2001 no advance could 
be reported. Defence Minister Kieffer is accused of embezzlement of funds 
destined to the victims of an earthquake in Cochabamba in 1998, which led 
to his dismissal in June 1999. He continued as a deputy and leader of the 
ADN-fraction. He is also involved in the purchase of the overpriced 
Kiefferavion, a Beachcraft that was supposed to be used to help victims of nat-
ural disasters but actually was used as the president's private plane and then 
as a sort of air-taxi at the disposal of ministers until it hit a wall at Potosi air-
port, where it remained awaiting eventual repair. 
Justice Minister Carlos Subirana (UCS) and Information Minister Jorge 
Landivar (ADN) lost their posts in August 1999 and March 2000, respec-
tively, for their alleged friendships with Marino Diodato. Diodato was born 
in Italy and had met Gina Banzer, daughter of Banzer's elder brother, in 
1983. They married and established themselves in Bolivia where Diodato 
came to cooperate closely with General Luis Iriarte, ex-chief of Banzer's 
Casa Militar and married to a niece of Yolanda Prada de Banzer. They 
worked together in setting up a parallel intelligence service. Diodato was 
arrested in June 1999 in a DEA-directed operation on charges of drug 
trafficking, money laundering, cloning mobile phones, the installation of 
illegal casinos, arms trafficking and spying. Although he was first absolved 
from the drug-trade charge, which provoked an irate reaction from US 
Ambassador Donna Hrinak, he was condemned to ten years in September 
2000. Throughout the episode Banzer affirmed that he hardly knew 
Diodato; a typical case of Banzer's selective amnesia, which also made him 
forget everything about his involvement in the Operation Condor.122 
While Diodato was eventually jailed, under strong pressure from die US 
Embassy, impunity was the norm. 
That seemed to change after Evo Morales had been expelled from the 
Chamber of Deputies. The outrage that followed made the deputies aware 
of their blunder and they started to seek 'ethical compensation' for the 
ousting of Morales. The first victim of diis 'ethical revolution' was Luis 
Alberto 'Chito' Valle who was also 'definitely separated' through the same 
questionable summary procedure, and a list was drawn up of 15 other can-
didates for ethical cleansing. Not much came of diat, and 'Chito' Valle also 
regained his immunity in 2002, after Evo Morales had successfully chal-
lenged the expulsion procedure. 
Still another case was that of Walter Guiteras, minister of the presi-
dency. In the first week of January 2001, the tabloid Extra in extremely sen-
sationalist style reported that Guiteras's wife, Lourdes Arias, had presented 
herself at the Brigade for Protection of Women and the Family in southern 
La Paz to denounce her husband for wife-beating. At first, Guiteras denied 
that anything had happened and claimed that it was all a plot concocted by 
media magnate, and former Banzer associate, Raul Garafulic. That started 
off a real time telenovela, with police accusing Guiteras of trying to bribe 
them, during which it became increasingly clear that something had hap-
pened and that Guiteras had only made things worse by lying about the case. 
That forced Guiteras to step down in mid January. People commented that, 
if there had been a plot, Guiteras himself must have been in it. 
But so much for 'power, corruption and lies'. The list of cases is too long 
to reel off and it is time to pay brief attention to die issue of inner-party 
democracy. As Dunkerley has noted,123 Mainwaring and Scully (1995) 
describe die Bolivian party system as 'inchoate', although the chapter in their 
book that deals with Bolivia124 describes it as patrimonialist and, given our 
foregoing account, one might use the term prebendalist.125 Perhaps die 
122 Sivak (2001). 
123 Dunkerley (2000) p. 50. 
124 Gamarra and Malloy (1995). 
125 Parties routinely deduct ten per cent of the wages of clients who have been given a 
place in the state bureaucracy (World Bank, 1999). I low far nepotism goes in Bolivia 
can also be gathered from a declaration by Banzer's wife Yolanda Prada, who, answer-
ing criticisms on the number of her and her husband's relatives in government serv-
ice, stated that there was nothing abnormal about it. She pointed out that everybody 
would aKvavs try to do their best for their family and help them as much as possible. 
'Everybody in my position would do the same,' she argued. Although her remark met 
with much criticism, it cannot be denied that she was right about the 'normality' of 
the practice — only it had usually not been defended that shamelessly before. 
notions are not mutually exclusive. As noted, Bolivian democratic institution-
ality has strongly relied on pacts among party leaderships.126 Despite occa-
sional rhetoric against the neoliberal model imposed in 1985 this did not 
materialise in the form of effective opposition. The rise of the neo-populist 
parties and the deficiencies of the electoral system that became rather mani-
fest in the 1989 elections, however, prompted negotiations and agreements 
among the parties regarding institutional and electoral reforms and opened 
the way for the 1994 reform of the Constitution. The system of 'pacted 
democracy' combined continued implementation of an economic model, 
which generated exclusion, with a deficient and merely symbolic form of 
political inclusion. It basically operated by way of the division of spoils 
among coalition partners who would be allotted ministries and then could 
contract party militants in return for their loyalty. Programmatic issues or the 
representation of popular concerns were, at best, of secondary importance. 
In the wake of the 1994 constitutional reform some attempts have been 
made to do something about the 'representation deficit' that characterises the 
Bolivian party system,127 though increasing abstensionism, the outcomes of 
the 2002 elections and the rise of the so-called anti-systemic forces suggest 
that the renovation has not been terribly successful. New legislation on polit-
ical parties obliges them to democratise and hold internal elections. Although 
most parties formally complied with the rules, the UCS distributing bags of 
noodles to broaden its membership, the internal elections in ADN were par-
ticularly fraudulent. A final feature of the party system that needs attention 
is the rise of the 'anti-systemics'. We have already discussed Evo Morales 
and El Mallku. They converted their mobilisation capacity into parties: the 
MAS and the MIP. The two most remarkable elements of their electoral 
successes in June 2002 were that they did so well in spite of the fact that 
these parties were portrayed as extremist, subversive, un-democratic and 
'irrational', and that they increasingly played the ethnic card, not hesitating 
to polarise between 'mighty blanco-mestizos' and 'subjected and exploited 
indigenas\ something considered taboo in the increasingly politically cor-
rect context of Bolivian politics. Whereas these elements would have led 
most political observers in the country to the conclusion that they would 
seriously hinder these parties from obtaining any significant share of the 
vote, things turned out otherwise. The contradiction between the 'logical' 
126 The Pacto por la Democracia of MNR and ADN (1985-89), the Acuerdo Patriotico, 
a gentleman's agreement between MIR and ADN (1989-93), the Pacto de 
Gobernabilidad between MNR/MRTK-L/MBL and the UCS (1993-97), the 
Compromiso por Bolivia which sustained Banzer's 'megacoalicion' of ADN/NFR, 
MIR, UCS and CONDEPA (1997-2002). After the 2002 elections a pact was bro-
kered between the MNR-MBL, MIR and UCS to sustain Sanchez de Lozada's 
Gobierno de Responsabilidad Nacional. 
127 Tapia and Toranzo (2000). 
implausibility of their success and the fact that they achieved it regardless, 
is suggestive of how much credibility the system had lost. 
Before coalescing in support for the MAS and the MIP, this loss of 
credibility was reflected in the appearance of some 'anti-systemic' politi-
cians. One of them was Alberto Costa Obregon, a maverick judge who 
had handled various famous cases,128 until he was suspended for 'abuse of 
power'. That launched him into politics and after 'Black September' (the 
protest peak) he gained a substantial following that called for a Constituent 
Assembly and argued that to stop corruption the political parties should 
be dispensed with. At a certain point he scored some 15 per cent in elec-
toral preference polls. Another 'anti-systemic' was ex-MBL Juan del 
Granado, the mayor of La Paz, nicknamed 'Juan Sin Miedo' for his, con-
sidering the time, bold stand as a lawyer moving heaven and earth to put 
former dictator Garcia Meza, the cruellest of them all, behind bars in the 
early 1980s. After having been elected mayor of La Paz in 1999, however, 
his popularity dropped when a corruption scandal erupted over the leasing 
of die municipal urinals in that city And then there is Manfred Reyes Villa 
with his NFR, who occasionally in a rather opportunistic ploy poses as an 
'anti-systemic'. At some point in mid-2000 it was rumoured that an alliance 
was in the making between Manfred Reyes Villa, Johnny Fernandez of the 
UCS and Evo Morales, but this never materialised and it would hardly have 
been a credible coalition. 
VI 
Democracy and elections: the story of their divergence 
Bolivia's democratic institutionality has not recently been under threat. 
Banzer's desperate attempt to underscore his democratic vocation, having 
been elected president still tainted as 'the former dictator', kept him, in 
general, from manoeuvres like dissolving parliament or unconstitutional 
decrees. The state of siege he once decreed cost lives, but was short-lived; 
it rapidly became clear that no solution to the threat posed by die unrest 
was enhanced by suspending civil and political rights. Being confronted 
with the choice between full dictatorial repression and a return to the 
negotiating table, the authorities opted for the latter. On the whole, gov-
ernment in the end tended to negotiate with protesters — and subse-
quently failed to deliver. 
However, Banzer's presidency was marred by various debatable deci-
sions with regard to the upholding of democratic standards. More dian 
128 Among them the case of Dante Escobar, who managed the ADN campaign funds as 
well as the Complementary Fund for Public Administration, from which he chan-
neled funds to ADN. He fled to Argentina in 1997 and was captured in 1998. 
once the government recurred to the military to 'restore order' in the many 
cases of protest actions. And during his government dozens of people 
were killed in confrontations between police or military forces and pro-
testers, most of them in the Chapare region. Last, but not least, ongoing 
and new mechanisms of financial corruption and political manipulation, 
along with the impunity of politicians who broke the law or dodged their 
tax obligations, also detracted from 'clean' democratic norms. To this 
ambiguous record of respect for democracy, the total failure to improve 
economic performance and social policies should be added. Taken togeth-
er, these traits left unaltered, and probably even exacerbated, a legacy of 
deep distrust among a substantial majority of the population with regard 
to the political system. Many feel that there is a wide gap between their 
concerns and those of the politicians. 
The gulf between the population's needs and expectations in Bolivia is 
long-standing. Additionally, the process of industrialisation and economic 
progress has been weak and ambiguous, as has modernisation in general, 
particularly in terms of democratic representation and institutionality. 
Thousands of Bolivians feel their interests, and the consequences of polit-
ical measures on their livelihoods, are hardly ever reflected in political 
deliberations. They do not have, and have never had, the feeling that a 
political alternative is available in which solid trust to defend and express 
their problems can be deposited. Awkwardly, the discursive tropes on 
'speaking the common people's language' and 'being a non-politician, but 
someone of the people' have marked recent electoral contests — but have 
never resulted in anything tangible. The party system as a mediation sys-
tem between society and the state has, in recent years, only deteriorated 
further.129 Such situations have made Ninou Guinot suggest that Latin 
America is characterised by strong parties but a weak party system.130 Parties 
monopolise the field of representation and disqualify or co-opt alternative 
organisational forms, but at the same time, these features result in a mal-
functioning mediating mechanism. The feeling of having no access through 
institutional and formal electoral mechanisms131 has fostered a tradition of 
resolving political and social conflicts through extra-parliamentary means. 
129 Gamboa (2001). 
130 Ninou Guinot (2000), p. 146. 
131 Trust in politicians and parties is traditionally low in Latin America, but reaches dra-
matic lows in Bolivia: according to a 1990 survey, 77 per cent of Bolivians expressed 
the conviction that parties did not work for the good of the country and merely 
defended group interests (Gamboa, 2001, p. 101; see also Berthin Siles and Yanez 
1999, pp. 37-44). According to The Economist (17 August 2002), most countries in the 
region saw support for how democracy worked in their countries increase between 
1996 and 2002; but in Bolivia it did so only slightly. Even so, over 70 per cent of the 
respondents expressed partial or total dissatisfaction. Nevertheless, as the survey on 
which these conclusions are based reveals, support for democracy as such, as the 
This tendency has been prolonged and even re-enforced in recent 
years. First of all, traditional lack of trust in politicians, parties and their 
slogans and promises has been cemented by recent policies through which 
the state withdrew from previously formal responsibilities and tasks. 
Parties and politicians are, today, viewed as bartering what, at least in prin-
ciple, should be their raison d'etre, to take on the task of developing the 
country and promote the well being of Bolivians as a whole. Whereas tra-
ditionally 'only' compliance with what was perceived as the state's tasks 
used to remain undelivered, today even the recognition of the state's role 
in caring for the nation's welfare through active intervention is denied by 
post-'national developmentist' politicians. This perception, added to well-
founded suspicions regarding corruption and untrustworthiness, gives rise 
to the 'normalisation' of fierce, inconsiderate and radical protest, which in 
recent years has developed into a nursery for 'anti-systemic' politicians and 
political entities. However, people feel the consequences of policies of pri-
vatisation and deregulation, and the lack of access to politics, in their daily 
life in very different degrees and areas. This gives rise to protests that are, 
in general, defensive in character, diffuse in subject and incidental in scope, 
but that, even so, erupt with increasing frequency and desperate radicalism. 
Such developments also indicate the relevance of questions regarding 
political culture.132 If political culture is defined in a very general way as 
consisting of 'attitudes, values, beliefs and experiences that predominate in 
a given society . . . translated into people's views on politics, their assess-
ment of political systems and their own role in the polity',133 it becomes 
clear that the attitudes and standpoints of political contestants are not 
defined by 'immediate causes'. Entrenched expectations, engrained images 
and historically forged feelings of individual and group identity, as well as 
imagery surrounding opponents, also inform these attitudes. In Bolivia, as 
in many other Latin American countries, such expectations, imageries and 
views have been nourished traditionally by a curious blend of liberal and 
rule-of-law discourses, distrust of an untrustworthy political class, clien-
telism, populism and elitism and feelings of exclusion, but also a certain 
degree of trust in and expectations about a developmentalist and protec-
tive or 'compassionate'134 state; even if such protection and compassion 
preferable political system increased, which makes The Economist talk about 'a ray of 
faint hope for democrats' (ibid, p. 41). It is worth mentioning that contempt for politi-
cal parties in Bolivia increased (parties scoring only ten out of a 40 possible points), as 
did the rejection of the idea that privatisations have benefited the country. Hostility 
towards privatisation in Bolivia is now only behind that in Argentina, Paraguay and 
Uruguav. 
132 Salman'(2002). 
133 Camp (2001), p. 7. 
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was scant and arbitrary. A state declaring itself unwilling and incapable of 
upholding the minimal welfare regulations it inherited from the past, and 
implementing measures that undo, for instance, subsidies targeted at the 
poor, therefore clashes with more than simple rejection of these measures; 
it faces a battle on the very significance of its prerogatives.135 
Secondly, recent socioeconomic developments exacerbated traditional 
segregation and did not contribute to social and cultural integration. The 
long-established ruptures widened and mutual suspicion grew. 
Representation weakened and livelihoods deteriorated. As a result, under-
privileged groups tended to greet, with increasing vehemence, any pro-
posal or measure 'from above' with deep distrust. This led to demands and 
positions that displayed little empathy with opponents' points of view and 
interests. A sort of 'enclosure in the proper right' on both sides hindered 
dialogue and compromise.136 At the same time there is a growing inability 
to identify companions in adversity and to articulate shared interests and 
possible alliances.137 
Thirdly, the initiatives for decentralisation and the promotion of local par-
ticipation that Banzer inherited from Goni, originally given the benefit of the 
doubt by large sectors of the population, got bogged down in bickering, sab-
otage and squabbling, thus contributing to the already strong feelings of 
being denied formal, institutionalised, effective channels of debate. In this 
sense, these developments reflected the persistence of 'limited democracy',138 
and possibly support the even more daunting assertion that 'limited democ-
racy in Latin America is not necessarily a temporary or transitional stage, but 
could well be an enduring form of government that mixes a substantial 
degree of democracy with a substantial degree of authoritarianism'.139 This 
dovetails quite neady with O'Donnell's remarks about the difference between 
elected governments and democratic regimes and his suggestion that nodiing 
guarantees that a 'second transition' to such democratic regimes will occur.140 
We also have pointed out how Habermas's notion of 'fictions of constitu-
tional law' may apply to Bolivia, where protest movements were disqualified 
on the grounds that they lacked official credentials, despite their legitimacy 
among the population.141 Consequendy, a strong sense of 'they only listen to 
force' consolidated both among traditional contenders (labourers, miners, 
teachers) as well as among new constellations of protesters (water-con-
sumers, coca farmers, pensioners, transportistas and others). 
135 Salman (2000b). 
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On the whole, the process suggests that democratic consolidation failed 
to occur. Institutional credibility has receded in recent years instead of 
advancing. In turn, trust in public debate, in state responsiveness and in offi-
cial channels and procedures for dialogue failed to materialise. The normal-
ity of democracy and democratic procedures did not deepen, because trust 
in its potential to take up die grievances and alternatives presented from 
within society was systematically undermined. The distrust not only refers to 
specific stances and die interests of specific sectors, but also includes the 
very efficiency and capacity of state institutions. As Diamond remarked, the 
confidence in the very ability of state institutions to design and implement 
political measures is at least as important as the trust in these institutions 
being able to pursue a specific action or arrangement.142 The 'real' and rele-
vant intervention-potential and disposition of the state is, as we noted at the 
outset, a necessary precondition, and its effectiveness a crucial component 
in the growth of societal trust in the system. On all these fronts Bolivian 
democracy has failed to deliver and has failed to nourish the basic popular 
reliance on which a consolidated democracy could rest. 
The democratic deficit evolved into a structural mismatch between the 
perceptions, worries and interests of large sectors in society and the poli-
ty. Parties and authorities are unable to express society's reading of politi-
cal measures and their social effects, and to channel uncertainties and 
demands towards authorities. State institutions have, in the eyes of the 
overwhelming majority, been unable and/or reluctant to intervene in a way 
that would 'make a difference'. Instead they tend to be absorbed in inter-
nal and mutual squaring of account, in persevering to recruit their cadres 
from unrepresentative population sectors, and at the same time have per-
sisted in receiving new political contenders with bad faith through self-pro-
tective legislation relating to political parties and ad hoc measures if need-
ed. The 'natural way' in which ballots are a meaningful exercise for winning 
constituents' votes through competing party programmes and convincing 
candidacy has become an empty ritual in Bolivia. Voting has become 
detached from party programmes, profiles or ideological tendencies, and 
programmes and representatives fail to inspire trust. This state of affairs is 
responsible for the fact that the large number of fragmented protests of 
recent years — to the surprise of many — coalesced into significant elec-
toral success for 'anti-systemics', with candidates not only present repre-
sentative bodies, but also fiercely rejecting the whole apparatus of repre-
sentation and government as it functions at present. Affiliation with the 
traditional political contenders proved, among a large sector of the voters, 
very weak. However, it was not the individual parties, but the disfunction-
ality of current democracy that was the target, and in 2002 this became the 
message of the new voices, languages and attire in the legislative bodies. 
142 Diamond (1996), p. 239. 
This is a significant change, but still far from a decisive one. The 
protests, as stated above, remained fragmented and mosdy reactive. Most 
actions and manifestations did not reveal a coordinated, or even cognate 
cluster of views and proposals on the part of the protesters. Many inci-
dents were ad hoc, isolated and triggered by contingencies, often had an 
opportunistic countenance and were not geared to one another. In part 
this is explained by exclusion: where large sectors of the population, and 
their interests, are ignored or silenced in the realm of politics and institu-
tions (and to a lesser degree: the media), their discontent assumes the form 
of disarticulated, fragmented eruptions. They do not find an established 
entity that represents, formulates and glues together their grievances and 
frustrations, and as a consequence, these criticisms operate on a mush-
room basis. Additionally, the fragmentation is due to social, regional and 
even ethnic heterogeneity, to government's attempts to divide and rule and 
to the fact that measures tend to primarily affect specific sectors, who 
often are not in the — informational — position to connect their fate with 
overall political tendencies. It gives the rise of 'anti-systemics' its character 
of incapacity to fight traditional politics with the weapons the latter should 
be able to manage: political debate, cohesive views on various aspects of 
the country's state of affairs, alternative proposals and the ability to form 
alliances. No 'orderly' or 'argument-focused' debate on political directions 
or alternatives takes place in current Bolivia. The 'anti-systemics' are still a 
far cry from performing as 'alternative systemics', and do not yet perform 
as a coherent voice of those who, rejecting the traditional practices of 
exclusion, gave them their vote. 
Nevertheless, leaders and spokespeople insist on the culpability of 
international capital, structural adjustment policies and privatisation — 
and of racially structured exploitation and discrimination, for that matter. 
And in spite of fragmentation, protest was not random. Reviewing 
motives, themes and occasions, it becomes clear that protest expressed 
anger and anxiety triggered by the consequences people suffered from a 
whole range of political measures inspired by restructuring and adjustment 
policies in a setting of institutional incapacity, ineffectiveness and political 
squabbling. These combined economic transformations that undermined 
the security of livelihoods and attempted political changes that failed to 
bring about real participation, in spite of talk about transparency, dialogue 
and participation, should be held responsible for the sustained wave of 
protest with which Banzer's administration saw itself confronted. 
The 2002 elections, then, were about more than the 'punishment' of 
the incumbent parties, and about more than growing sympathy for radical 
protest voices. To be sure, the outcomes suggest that the government — 
and all 'established' parties for that matter — failed to disqualify the main 
protagonists of the protest cycles as extremist and unworthy-of-interlocu-
tion politicians, and at the same time failed to qualify themselves as the 
exclusively legitimate representational 'game in town'. Both Quispe and 
Morales obtained a vote that scoffs all attempts to simply dismiss them as 
irresponsible agitators and anti-democratic troublemakers. Precisely in that 
sense, their success points at more than just a shift in preference. 
Especially given that the US ambassador's warning not to vote for Morales 
underpinned his success, the suspicion arises that a questioning of the 
whole system of claimed democratic legitimacy is at stake.143 A politico-
cultural challenge surfaced, in which the present de facto legitimacy of the 
division between included and excluded citizens, and the status of the 
dominating group as 'rightful representatives', is called into question. 
Behind this is a radicalised, albeit not programmatically articulated, 
demand for democratic representation and civic participation,144 and for a 
U-turn in political-economic direction. Not merely a demand for effective 
inclusion in currently ongoing economic transformations, but a demand 
for a voice in the formulation and conceptualisation of what development 
and democracy stand for, is at stake.145 
That, however, is more of a subtext than an explicit message. The 
explicit statement risks remaining confined to ethnic polarisation. 
Morales' and Quispe's success is especially worrying for Bolivia's power-
holders because it is associated with elements that make a simple recon-
ciliation and integration in the existing party system unlikely. This comes 
to the fore primarily in the fact that their programmatic and political 
utterances evoke longstanding socioeconomic, regional and ethnic clefts, 
often in Manichean terms. Both Morales and Quispe, besides focusing on 
concrete issues and topical confrontations, recur to identity politics and 
suggested incompatibilities between western globalisation and the roots 
and values of their social bases.146 With such discursive resources, uneasi-
ness among political contenders easily turns into fear and mutual demon-
ising — and represents a refusal to enter in a genuine debate on manifest 
and underlying grievances. 
However, it should be noted that, although Morales' discourse includes 
motifs about die 'defence of the sacred leaf' it is essentially an anti-imperi-
alist discourse that centres on a 'dignity' and 'sovereignty' opposed to the 
proposals of die Banzer government that equated dignity with eradication, 
and thus did not uphold sovereignty in the face of US impositions. MAS dis-
course thus couples anti-imperialism with a — perhaps not altogether up-to-
date — socialist programme. On the other hand, Quispe's belligerent dis-
course is also shifting in a search for equitable dialogue and an adherence, 
143 Gamboa (2001), p. 102. 
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145 See Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar (1998); Assies, van der Maar and Hoekema (2000). 
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even if only provisional, to democracy, coupled with the threat of new road-
blocks if agreements are not complied with. On occasion he stresses that his 
is not a discourse of revanchisme and that not taking into account the inter-
ests of the poor k yaras would be political suicide. He also rejects the accusa-
tion of 'reverse racism' and often stresses that he is not demanding 'tanks 
and guns but tractors and ploughs'. In September 2002, threatening road-
blocks, he invited the incoming government to a dialogue in the isolated 
community of Amaguaya 'where there is no water or electricity' in order to 
make them 'descend from their palaces and know reality on the ground'. He 
invited the president and his ministers to share in a fricase de vicuna, to which 
they eventually agreed. With his particular sense of humour, Quispe com-
mented that the presidential delegation left the place with diarrhoea.147 
Precisely because of these tensions around the entry of the Indian in 
parliament, it becomes clear that the message goes beyond a reallocation 
of power among diverse political fractions, or an electoral backlash 
against corruption. With the renewed ethnic polarisation, previously 
channelled through CONDEPA and UCS, Bolivia's democracy harvested 
its systemic deficiencies. 
VII 
Goni's return and fall 
The second 'Goni' Sanchez de Lozada administration has been short-lived; 
some 13 months after taking office a wave of popular protest that coalesced 
around the issue of intended gas exports to the United States forced the 
president to flee the country and seek refuge in Miami in October 2003. In 
February the introduction of a new tax bill had already triggered a round of 
violent protest and riots. By October, clashes between protest movements 
and the forces of order had claimed a total of around 140 lives, which made 
the second Sanchez de Lozada government the bloodiest following Bolivia's 
return to democracy. Over the course of the years 'democratic institutional-
ity' and the maintenance of the economic model increasingly had come to 
rely on repression of protest movements. As the system of elected govern-
ments failed to develop into a democratic regime able to respond to the con-
cerns of the population, Bolivia slid toward a democradura. While the scenario 
that unfolded in Bolivia has its particularities the parallels to events in 
Ecuador and Argentina in recent years are notable. 
The three cases mentioned are suggestive of the challenges facing dem-
ocratic governance in Latin America, which recently have come under 
scrutiny in the UNDP-sponsored assessments of the 'quality of democra-
cy' in Latin America. Such endeavours seek to reframe the debates on 
147 Personal communication, 7 October 2002, Mexico. 
democratic consolidation by taking into account aspects that go beyond 
the mere institutional features of the regime. Attention is refocused on the 
role of the state in providing an environment in which democracy can 
flourish — particularly where the rule of law is concerned — and by giv-
ing renewed attention to the societal context and issues such as income dis-
tribution that have tended to be marginalised in the exclusively institution-
alist approach that has come to dominate much of the debate on demo-
cratic consolidations.148 The 'quality of democracy' perspective also draws 
attention to the capability, and the willingness, of governments to 'make a 
difference'.149 Given the US and multilateral system's attitudes the ability 
of Bolivian governments to make a difference until now has been severe-
ly circumscribed, while willingness has been low. Under these circum-
stances, the attempts at institutional engineering to gain a semblance of 
legitimacy — the Law of Popular Participation, the electoral reform and 
the law on party organisation — have backfired since die established party 
system was not able to reform itself, although it was able to co-opt the 
neo-populist parties into the system of 'pacted democracy' and the repar-
tition of spoils. The combination of symbolic integration and actual exclu-
sion, however, exposed what we have called the 'autism' of the party sys-
tem to much of the population, leading to electoral abstensionism and 
sympathy for 'anti-systemic' forces on the one hand, and the shift towards 
a democradura on the other. The second Sanchez de Lozada government 
harvested these tensions and turned out to be unable and unwilling to 
manage them in any creative way. As a result, the tendency toward 
democradura was reinforced and resulted in a death toll that exceeded that of 
any previous institutionally democratic government. 
To be sure, in economic terms the government faced adverse condi-
tions beyond its control: the crisis in Argentina furdier affected trade, led 
to illegal imports at prices the national industry is unable to compete with 
and resulted in massive return-migration, exacerbating unemployment. 
Brazil's feeble economic and monetary performance will not rapidly 
improve and the global economic slowdown has further afflicted the coun-
tries' export prospects, while die difficult birth of the Andean Trade 
Preference Act (APTA)150 does not bode well for export expansion either. 
The things that were, in principle, within the government's reach also 
appear to be beset with problems. Economic reactivation will be hard to 
obtain. Almost cynically taking into account current poverty rates, The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, in its 'Bolivia Country Report' of August 
2002 reports that inflation would probably remain below three per cent 'as 
148 O'Donnell, Iazetta and Vargas Cullel (2003). 
149 Ninou Guinot (2000). 
150 See The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, August 2002. 
domestic demand will only rise modestly'. With a bleak outlook for both 
export prospects and internal acquisition power, it is hard to see where 
substantial growth could come from. Moreover, the source just mentioned 
also predicted that the new administration would 'have to reconcile elec-
tion pledges to increase public sector investment with pressures from the 
IMF and international lenders to consolidate public finances after fiscal 
slippage over the past 18 months'. Yet Goni stated in a press conference 
direcdy after his election that 'this will be a government of much inter-
vention in the economy, to make it work... ' That was quite an unconven-
tional statement for a self-declared neoliberal and underscores the dilem-
mas the government faced. Though unwilling to steer another course, the 
government was well aware that in Bolivia distrust towards globalisation 
and the IMF is huge, and it was reticent to publicly applaud its role. 
Thus, there seemed to be little room for manoeuvre and it was unlike-
ly that the salaries in most state sectors, such as education, the civil serv-
ice, the army and the police, would rise (although the higher ranks received 
increases before, despite the adverse economic circumstances). It also was 
unlikely that employment opportunities would grow significandy, particu-
larly since the IMF would be reluctant to approve new government expen-
diture on major infrastructural projects, which Goni had announced. In 
that context the project to export gas to the USA emerged as a 'window of 
opportunity', at least from the government's point of view. 
Immediately after his inauguration Goni presented his 'Plan Bolivia', to 
state his government's key intentions. It was a rather meagre list of 12 
points, most of them rather tattered and, in their verbal form, uncontro-
versial. The plan revealed no details and gave rise to the suspicion that it 
was first and foremost meant to dampen traditional MIR-MNR animosity. 
More concrete measures and propositions already suggested that the 
MIR's anti-neoliberal and anti-privatisation rhetoric might be a little more 
than sheer rhetoric. 
Additionally, the usual dance around the golden calf of power, influ-
ence and budget control did not stay away — and since besides the MIR, 
other government supporters such as the UCS and ADN demanded their 
share, it was foreseeable that tensions and disputes over appointments 
would mark the new administration. While the power to distribute lower 
level positions and jobs would be at stake, the renewal of positions in the 
Supreme Court of Justice, the Judiciary Council, the National Electoral 
Council and the Ombudsman were bound to become particularly difficult 
issues, not only because they would be subject to infighting within the 
coalition but also because the coalition did not have the two-thirds major-
ity required to make these appointments and therefore would have to find 
ways to strike deals with some of the opposition parties, the always 
ambiguous NFR being the most likely candidate. The same went for a 
reform of the Constitution, which had been prepared during the previous 
government as prescribed by the Bolivian Constitution. 
Opposition from the MAS and the MIP could be expected to be unre-
lenting. Resistance to coca eradication now would not only come from the 
peasantry in the Chapare and Yunga regions but would also strongly rever-
berate within Parliament.151 An end has come to the almost complete par-
liamentary consensus on the 'righteousness' of the attempt to terminate 
coca cultivation. The arguments of 'Bolivia's sovereignty' and its cultural 
legacy are nowadays more strongly stressed and meet with support among 
large sectors of the electorate. 
As such, the new parliamentary make-up demonstrates that the pene-
tration and co-optation of social movements by political parties has, to a 
certain degree, been reversed; now the movements have in an unprece-
dented way made themselves present in the political parties' bulwark. 
Moreover, these 'political instruments' of the coca-growers and radical 
Katarists show an unprecedented ideological firmness — though com-
bined with programmatic weakness. They will not easily compromise and 
have obtained a relatively large share in parliament. This is a rupture with 
a tradition in which the establishment of unlikely and ad hoc alliances was 
a daily occurrence and a concomitant lack of trust in politicians' campaign 
platforms ran through the entire political spectrum. Anti-neoliberalism is 
now commonplace in Parliament, not only opportunistically for purposes 
of political gain, but by those who, in very fundamental terms, question 
the model's necessity and its alleged beneficial long-term effects. 
Parliamentary clashes are heightened by accusations about the existence 
of 'two Bolivias', and concrete issues are played out in terms of an overall 
opposition between traditional haves and have-nots. Rhetoric is uncompro-
mising. From die MAS and MIP benches, fierce criticism of die mank'agas-
tos (those who eat widiout working; for example, all who belong to tradi-
tional parties and having been and still are thieves and loafers) was voiced 
from die start, as were grand words like 'etnocidio' and 'economicidio'. We 
are the ones diat used to work for you,' said Felipe Quispe in his provoca-
tive speech in the parliamentary session in which Goni was elected president 
(3 August 2002). 'Here we are, die Indians — we have become more now 
and we'll be more still,' was another remark. Forms of ethnic polarisation 
have become prominent in Bolivian politics. The odier side of die coin is, of 
course, that the patrimonial political culture of Bolivia is being disputed in a 
new way. New mechanisms to defy the de facto sharing out of power and 
151 Initially the new government sought to negotiate with the coca farmers, but their 
room for manoeuvre was severely limited as a result of US pressures. By January 2003 
the situation had deteriorated to the extent that new confrontations took place, claim-
ing several lives. 
the ineffective instances of control have become available to those who 
declare themselves the debarred peoples of Bolivia. 
Preparing the main part of this text, which focused on the outcomes of 
the 2002 elections, we could not have guessed the events that were to follow, 
nor their pace. The events that marked 2003, however, suggest that our 
assessment of the 'Bolivian condition' was fairly adequate: when the author-
ities demonstrated that they still had not understood the message of the 2002 
elections and were unwilling to change the 'set of rules and procedures estab-
lished in accord with the prevailing relations of (political, military and eco-
nomic power)',152 and dius persisted in obstructing a democracy that the 
Bolivians would recognize themselves, a new confrontation was unavoidable. 
A first round of protests erupted in February 2003, when the government 
introduced a new tax bill leading to an outburst of violent protest that cost 
over 30, and perhaps as many as 50, lives. At the end of September another 
round of protests started, culminating in 'Black October', which claimed 
some 70 lives and the resignation of President Sanchez de Lozada. 
The impuestazo revolt of February 2003 
The February protests broke out when, forced by a large fiscal deficit and 
the need to obtain a new IMF loan which would only arrive if the deficit 
was reduced, Goni's government designed an impuestazo — a tax bill — 
which amounted to a 12.5 per cent increase in income tax for every salary 
above 880 Bolivianos (approximately US$115). From the outset, the pro-
posal produced broad protest, for its failure to contemplate progressive 
taxation and for ('once again') making poor Bolivians pay the bill for defec-
tive governing. The sectors that would be hurt by the measure were the 
government and employees of large enterprises; the many people working 
in the informal sector would only be affected indirectly. 
Among the most prominent protesters were the police. They took to the 
street on 12 February to reject the proposal and to insist on a pay rise for 
which they had been asking for a long time. As usual in situations of street 
protest, the presidential palace on the Plaza Murillo was guarded by a small 
military detachment. On the Plaza the police were joined by a group of sec-
ondary school pupils. They were there to demand the dismissal of their 
school principal and also to express their rejection of government policy in 
general and the tax bill more particularly. The military opened fire when the 
pupils threw stones at the presidential palace, smashing most of the win-
dows. As the pupils immediately ran, the first victims were the police 
demonstrators. They, in turn, opened fire on the palace. In the chaos, the 
president was evacuated and rapidly negotiated the withdrawal of the police 
152 Vilas (1999), p. 9. 
from the streets of La Paz. Subsequently, the crowd that had meanwhile 
gathered on and around the Plaza attacked the vice-president's offices and 
the ministries of Sustainable Development and Labour, proceeded to the 
offices of ElectroPaz and the customs, and ended up looting various shops 
in the city centre. This pillaging ended die next day 
Remarkably, in these events the two most powerful and consistent 
protest groups were not the protagonists. The MAS, headed by Evo 
Morales, however, did not hesitate in demanding the president's resigna-
tion and threatening new protest activities. Felipe Quispe joined them in 
this demand and threat, although his relationship with Morales remained 
tense. Both, however, reacted to events rather than initiating them. 
Their reaction added to other challenges faced by the government: pen-
sioners were protesting against the pittance they received, consumers 
against price increases and privatisations, schoolteachers at their wages, 
entrepreneurs against the failure to reactivate the economy, the coca farm-
ers had just negotiated a temporary hold in eradication and the highland 
farmers were still awaiting the delivery of a series of tractors, as a token 
concession by the government before proceeding with a more systematic 
handling of the whole package of peasant grievances. Within all these 
groups, and among these groups, affinities remained fragile — cooperation 
is weak or non-existent and allegiances shift from ethnic through socioe-
conomic and sectoral to regional and national, in shifting configurations 
and relative primacy. 
The government withdrew the tax bill, and in the days that followed the 
whole cabinet was reshuffled. This measure was accompanied by a presi-
dential address to the nation asking for calm and for comprehension 
regarding the need for austerity policies. In his address, he emphasised that 
the government was setting an example by reducing the number of min-
istries and by the president forsaking his salary. The protest threats con-
tinued, however, and in the course of the cabinet reshuffle the coalition 
parties began a struggle for influence as if nothing had occurred. 
The shock in the country was enormous. The press unanimously 
mourned the unprecedented number of dead — since democracy was 
restored — and diagnosed the government's incapacity to maintain order 
and its monopoly on violence because of the mutiny within the institu-
tions that are supposed to impose order. Press comments urgendy sug-
gested innovative measures to prevent the country from disintegrating. 
The government received a devastating blow and, according to observers' 
reports, insecurity was rife at all levels. 
The protests could not be dismissed as an 'eruption' and as mere loot-
ing, although elements of opportunistic raiding were doubdess present. 
Despite the character of uncoordinated and clashing pressure groups, 
there was a clear signal that the Sanchez de Lozada — and previous — 
government's handling of the socioeconomic crisis was rejected by large 
sections of the population, and that this rejection reached heights that dis-
credited the government's legitimacy. As far as the government was con-
cerned, however, that message did not get through, as is clear from the atti-
tude it adopted when a new wave of protest began to gather pace. 
Black October and the fall of Sanchez de Lozada 
The issue that became the common denominator of the conflicts that 
brought down Sanchez de Lozada was the intended sale of liquid natural 
gas (LNG) to the United States and Mexico, by way of Chile. Much more 
was at stake, however, as became clear from Sanchez de Lozada's last bid 
to resolve the conflict episode and from the inaugural address of Carlos D. 
Mesa Gisbert upon assuming the presidency, and in these speeches they 
only addressed a few of the issues. We shall first look briefly at the gas 
question and then discuss Goni's fall. 
The polemic over gas exports has its roots in the hydrocarbon legislation 
and the controversial 'capitalisation' process of the first Sanchez de Lozada 
administration. In the context of the capitalisation policy state enterprise 
Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) operations were split up 
into three enterprises: the Empresa Petrolera Andina was to be capitalised by 
the Argentine YPF-Perez Compano-Pluspetrol consortium, US based 
AMOCO was to capitalise the Empresa Petrolera Chaco and the network of 
pipelines was turned into Transredes, to be capitalised by ENRON-SHELL. 
The complementary legislation on hydrocarbons introduced a system of 
shared risk contracts with a residual YPFB, and of concessions to be regulat-
ed by a newly created Superintendency for Hydrocarbons. In order to pro-
mote private investment in exploration, exploitation and commercialisation, 
the Hydrocarbons Law distinguishes between 'existing' and 'new' hydrocar-
bons. While existing and already exploited fields would continue to pay a 50 
per cent fee (regalia) — the 'fifty-fifty' system of the previous legislation — 
newly discovered reserves would only pay 18 per cent.153 Apart from the fee, 
operators pay some 12 per cent in taxes on the value of oil or gas 'at the pit' 
(boca de pozo). Beyond the boca de pozo the product is the full property of the 
operator. Compared with other countries, the Bolivian system introduced in 
1996 is extremely generous with the private operators. The capitalisation pol-
icy, which was plagued with irregularities, has prompted an important increase 
of direct foreign investment in some sectors, particularly the hydrocarbons 
153 It is suspected that reserves already identified by YPFB have been classified as 'new' to 
the benefit of private operators. The 18% fee consists of 11 % of the value 'at the pit', 
which goes to the department where the operation takes place, 1% goes into a special 
fund for development of the Beni and Pando departments and 6% goes to YPFB, which 
transfers this revenue to the National Treasury after deduction of operating costs. 
sector, which received some 44 per cent of foreign investment in the priva-
tised sectors. While YPBF was being privatised Bolivia's proven gas reserves 
increased miraculously. If in 1996 they had been estimated at 6.6 trillion cubic 
feet, by 2002 die estimate stood at 52.3 trillion cubic feet, which made Bolivia 
the owner of the largest reserve in the Southern Cone and therefore the gas 
hub' for the region.154 Gas would become die business of the future diat 
would save the country, providing it widi a Svindow of opportunity' in the 
terminology of the multilateral agencies, which were quick to condition fur-
ther loans on the 'monetarisation' of these new riches. In 1999 the country 
started to export gas to Brazil and since then Brazilian demand has rapidly 
increased. With an average annual growth rate of 7.5 per cent during the 
1990s, the hydrocarbon sector became the most dynamic one, and by 2003 
gas had become Bolivia's main export product, accounting for 21.6 per cent 
of its exports and with a value of US$ 99.7 million.155 
In recent years the US West Coast and nordiern Mexico have become 
energy craving regions and Bolivia prepared to join the race to supply them 
with Liquefied Natural Gas to generate energy — mainly electricity. The own-
ers of die Margarita gas field in the Department of Tarija, British Petrol, 
British Gas and the Spanish enterprise REPSOL, formed a consortium widi 
Sempra Energy, which would take charge of distribution. Gas would be liq-
uefied and dien shipped, either from a Chilean or Permian port. The total 
investment at diat time was calculated at some US$5,000 million, of which 
US$1,800 million would be invested in Bolivia to develop the gas field and to 
construct a pipeline. The Bolivian government calculated that the project 
would yield a revenue of some US$310 million per year. The plan immedi-
ately generated controversy Both Peru and Chile offered harbour facilities, 
die port of Ilo and the port of Mejillones, respectively. This introduced the 
issue of Bolivia's access to the Pacific, which it had lost in die 1879 war with 
Chile. The gas project should be used as leverage to regain sovereign access 
to die ocean, it was argued. Chile's interest in facilitating Bolivian gas exports, 
it was also suspected, derived from the fact that Chile itself is in desperate 
need of gas and thus would eventually buy an important share of die gas 
exported to cater for its domestic market and to build a petrochemical indus-
try Anodier issue was that the project relied on a price 'at the pit' of US$0.70 
per thousand BTU (British Thermic Units), whereas the gas exported to 
Brazil is paid US$1.30 per thousand BTU.156 Finally, it was argued that pro-
154 It should be noted that 85% of the Bolivian reserves are located in the Tarija 
Department, a fact that fuels regionalism. 
155 INE, Nota de Prensa No. 76, 17 June 2003. 
156 The 'price at the pit' is the basis for the calculation of fees and taxes. This price is 
arrived at by deducting transportation and distribution costs from the final sales price. 
The difference between the price paid by Brazil and the price calculated for exports 
to the USA and Mexico derives from the higher transportation costs. 
cessing facilities should be located in Bolivia to generate employment, giv-
ing priority to the Bolivian population and industry. Gas derivatives should 
be produced in thecountry instead of exporting natural gas. 
Bolivian President Jorge Quiroga had tried to strike a deal before the 
end of his term but did not succeed and negotiations continued under the 
Sanchez de Lozada government. Meanwhile, a Coordinadora for the 
Defence of Gas had emerged, linked to Evo Morales' MAS and adamant-
ly opposed any export of gas through Chile where, the argument went, it 
would be used to develop a petrochemical industry, which should be devel-
oped in Bolivia. While opposition gathered pace, negotiations over the 
realisation of the project stalled, particularly after the February 2003 
revolt. It was increasingly, and probably rightly, suspected that the govern-
ment actually had already decided to export gas through a Chilean port. 
The gas issue became increasingly polarised. The government talked of 
a consultation and prepared a World Bank funded campaign to convince 
the population of the project. On the other hand, an Estado Mayor del 
Pueblo was formed in June 2003 to oppose government plans. Evo 
Morales and Oscar Olivera, who had been a key figure in the Water War, 
were prominent as was retired General Vito Ramirez Lopez, who stated 
that preparations were under way to construct the pipeline to Chile. 
Opposition parties MAS and NFR proposed a referendum on the gas 
issue, while in the Department of Tarija a regional movement arose to 
defend gas exports. By August the popularity of President Sanchez de 
Lozada had dropped to nine per cent and most of the population mis-
trusted him and his government coalition, which was continually engaged 
in shady deals and bickering over power shares. In a context of crisis and 
political paralysis the NFR entered the coalition in early August and nego-
tiated its share of ministries. That same month the election of Jaime 
Solares as the new executive secretary of the Central Obrera Boliviana 
(COB) meant that the government coalition lost control over the organi-
sation, which until then had been dominated by the MIR. The COB now 
allied itself with the opposition. And in mid August the MAS declared the 
'Gas War', stating that its strategy of going from 'protests to proposals' 
had fallen on deaf ears and that from now on it would adopt a strategy of 
'protests with proposals'.157 Widespread discontent began to coalesce 
around the gas issue. The pace of events quickened when some Aymara 
community leaders were arrested in the La Paz Department, accused of hav-
157 Although the MAS, which after the June 2002 elections had become a major opposi-
tion party, had difficulties in articulating a coherent programme, it also was given very 
little opportunity to negotiate issues by the governing coalition. In December 2002 
Evo Morales presented a list of 14 issues he wanted to discuss. The government 
replied that it would only discuss the coca issue with Morales and that he should not 
attempt to assume the representation of other sectors. 
ing been involved in the killing of two catde rusders. Aymara leader Felipe 
Quispe and nearly a thousand followers started a hunger strike in the prem-
ises of Radio San Gabriel in die city of El Alto, from where other protests 
were directed. Freeing the two community leaders was only one of the 
demands and was merely added to the list diat on various previous occasions 
had been negotiated with ministerial delegations. The gas issue was also 
added to the list, although Quispe did not enter the alliance formed by 
Morales. Roads were blocked in the region between La Paz and Lake 
Titicaca, trapping some 70 tourists. By 19 September, the government had 
decided on an operation to rescue the tourists, which was carried out the 
next day in Rambo style under the direct supervision of Defence Minister 
Carlos Sanchez Berzain. Six people were killed, five of them civilians and 
among them an eight year-old girl. That fuelled an escalation of Aymara 
peasant protests, while the city of El Alto was brewing up widi protests for 
a host of other reasons such as the introduction of new tax forms, a new 
Law on Citizen Security which favours repression of protest movements, the 
issue of autonomy for the newly created university in El Alto, and so on. 
Around the same time Congress was busy bickering over the nomina-
tion of new ministers to the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the 
Judiciary Council and of a new Ombudsman. The office of Ombudsman 
had been created in 1997 and the first to hold the post was Ana Maria 
Romero de Campero, who gained enormous prestige among the popula-
tion for her courageous defence of human rights and her denunciations of 
abuse in the repression of protests. She was now one of die candidates but 
withdrew her candidacy when it became clear that the governing coalition 
wanted to get her out of the way at any price and concocted the election 
of a candidate of its own through the usual means of power brokering 
among coalition partners. MNR candidate Ivan Zegada was manoeuvred 
into the post, to the outrage of much of the population. One more reason 
for mistrust of the government and protest had been created. 
Protests, roadblocks and demonstrations gradually escalated in El Alto 
and the northern La Paz region and started to spread to other parts of the 
country such as Cochabamba, Oruro, Sucre and Potosi. The government 
sought to minimise the issue and argued that only a small minority was cre-
ating disturbances. Protests became massive, however, with the gas issue 
serving as the symbol for generalised discontent. In this context the gov-
ernment resorted to tactics reminscent of the authoritarian regimes158 and 
relied on repressive measures, culminating in the killing of 26 persons on 
12 October. That day an army operation was carried out to bring tank 
trucks down from El Alto to fuel-starved La Paz. The trucks were escort-
158 Some newspapers, which suggested that Sanchez de Lozada should resign, were con-
fiscated at newspaper stands and opposition radio stations were attacked. 
ed by tanks and moved down to La Paz under heavy machine gun fire and 
in a cloud of teargas. The next day another 20 people were killed and Vice 
President Carlos Mesa withdrew his support for the president, stating that 
he could not support such disproportionate repression. 
Two days later, on 15 October, Goni appeared on television to address 
the nation. He was seconded by coalition partners Jaime Paz Zamora of the 
MIR and Manfred Reyes Villa of the NFR and had a statement read by his 
spokesman Mauricio Antezana. Sanchez de Lozada offered to hold a con-
sultative referendum by department to establish a policy on gas exports, to 
revise the hydrocarbons legislation through a consensual process with the 
oil companies, to incorporate the figure of a Constituent Assembly into the 
Constitution, according to constitutional procedure and, finally, reaffirmed 
his decision to uphold democracy and the constitutional order. In a short 
comment the president stated that he was the victim of a seditious con-
spiracy of narcos, terroristas and sindicatos. Upholding democracy and the 
institutional order was equated with his remaining in power. 
Goni offered far too little, far too late. A referendum by department 
meant that he was betting on the support of the eastern lowland depart-
ments to carry through his gas export project. Moreover, the referendum 
would only be consultative. Revising the hydrocarbons legislation with the 
help of the oil companies could not be expected to yield palpable advances 
and introducing the figure of a Constituent Assembly through constitution-
al procedure meant that such an assembly would not take place before 2012. 
The opposition immediately turned down the offer. With the moral support 
of ex-ombudsman Ana Maria Romero de Campero intellectuals, NGO per-
sonnel and human rights advocates began a hunger strike, recalling the 
movement that had helped to bring down the Banzer dictatorship in 1978. 
It meant that the middle classes now clearly joined the opposition to the 
Goni government. Under pressure from their rank and file. Manfred Reyes 
Villa and Jaime Paz Zamora finally withdrew their support for Goni on 17 
October, leaving him no other option than to resign. Goni fled the country 
to Miami, leaving behind a resignation letter that was accepted in Congress 
by 97 to 30 votes and Carlos Mesa assumed the presidency. 
Mesa's inaugural speech struck a very different tone than Goni's wild 
accusations about narco-terrorism and conspiracy, instead drawing atten-
tion to longstanding forms of ethnic exclusion and inequality and to the 
challenge posed by regional differences. Furthermore, he stressed that the 
defence of the constitutional institutional order cannot come at the price 
of disrespect for life and human rights. Among other things, he offered a 
binding referendum on gas exports, a modification of the hydrocarbons 
legislation and a review of the capitalisation process, to convoke a 
Constituent Assembly, to form a government without the direct participa-
tion of the political parties, and to struggle against corruption and to 
strengthen the rule of law. The review of the capitalisation process is in 
response to the widespread suspicions of irregularities and manifest fail-
ures in cases such as the capitalisation of the airlines, while the idea of 
convoking a Constituent Assembly should, among other things, address 
the issue of increasing regional and ethnic polarisation. Creating a govern-
ment without direct party involvement is not meant to imply that parties 
are dispensable, but rather to give it the time to recuperate the credibility 
of the Executive, the Parliament and the parties. 
For reasons of space it is impossible to offer a full analysis of the 
change in Bolivian government and the prospects for the future. We 
should, however, note that in his inaugural speech Carlos Mesa also 
offered to hold elections before the official end of his term in August 
2007. A few weeks later he withdrew this offer in the face of the threats 
by the most radical opposition groups to topple him if he would not meet 
their demands. Remarkably, the MAS was not among these groups and it 
should be noted that throughout the events that led to Goni's fall Evo 
Morales fully supported the process of constitutional succession and made 
no attempt to 'seize power' as television commentators predicted. After 
Carlos Mesa assumed the presidency MAS senator Filemon Escobar also 
picked out his adversaries when he stated We will impede any attempt of 
the MIR, MNR and NFR to use their parliamentary majority to screw 
Carlos Mesa'. He clearly referred to the UDP episode, when President Siles 
Suazo found himself between the rock and the hard place of MNR and 
ADN orchestrated opposition in parliament and the maximalist demands 
of the COB and other organisations, which led to his resignation and the 
calling of elections before they were due. The MAS thus shows itself to be 
a fierce defender of democratic institutionality and a supporter of the new 
government without imposing conditions, although the party does not fail 
to point out that there are huge problems to be resolved in order to avoid 
future disturbances. It thus seeks to position itself as a strong contender 
in the 2004 municipal elections and the 2007 presidential elections. On the 
other hand, the US government seems to allow little room for manoeuvre, 
insisting on the Svar on coca' as it has been carried out thusfar and on 
preservation of the economic model. 
The Carlos Mesa government has manifesdy stated its intention to 
reverse the shift towards a democradura and it is well aware of the deficien-
cies of the party system as it has operated until now. One of its stated 
objectives is to generate a new relationship between the polity and civil 
society based on trust. It has also shown its sensitivity to the sufferings of 
large sectors of the population under the current economic model, but the 
short-term economic prospects are rather gloomy. One question that 
remains to be resolved is 'what is to be done with the gas?' Nobody has 
suggested that it stay in the ground, as Sanchez de Lozada and Jorge 
Quiroga have asserted to discredit opposition to their project to export gas 
to the USA. What will eventually happen will depend on thorough negoti-
ations among a range of actors, both at the national and the international 
level. In the end, the regional market (Argentina, Brazil, Chile) might be a 
viable option, though it is fraught with complexities and diplomatic sensi-
bilities. For the moment the new government enjoys immense approval 
rates and the very solid support of the major 'anti-systemic' party, possi-
bly the only party that genuinely seeks to reform itself. Those are assets 
that might enable the government to make the difference the Bolivian 
population has merited for such a long time. But the task is huge, the room 
for manoeuvre is small and die shadow of history looms large. 
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